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Abst rac t - -Espec ia l l y  in mathemat ics  and in logic, lemmas (basic t ruths)  play a key role for 
proving theorems. In ring theory, for example, a useful lemma asserts that ,  for all e lements x, the 
product  in either order of 0 and x is 0; in two-valued sentential  (or propositional) calculus, a useful 
l emma asserts that ,  for all x, x implies x. Even in a lgor i thm writ ing and in circuit design, lemmas 
play a key role: minus(minus(x ) )  = x in the former and NOT(AND(x ,  y)) = OR(NOT(x) ,NOT(y) )  
in the latter. Whether  the object is to prove a theorem, write an algorithm, or design a circuit, and 
whether  the ass ignment is given to a person or (preferably) to an automated reasoning program, the 
judicious use of lemmas often spells the difference between success and failure. In this article, we 
focus on what  might be thought  of as a generalization of the concept of lemma, namely, the concept of 
resonator ,  and on a strategy, the resonance  strategy, that  keys on resonators. For example, where in 
Boolean groups - - those  in which the square of every x is the identity element e - - the  lemmas yzyz  = e 
and yyzz  = e are such that  neither generalizes the other, the resonator (formula schema) • • ** = e, 
by using each occurrence of "star" to assert the presence of some variable, generalizes and captures 
(in a manner  that  is discussed in this article) both lemmas. Note that  the cited resonator, if viewed 
as a lemma with star  replaced by some chosen variable, captures neither cited lemma as an instance. 
Lemmas of a theory are provably "true" in the theory and, therefore, can be used to complete an 
ass ignment.  In contrast,  resonators, which capture collections of equations or collections of formulas 
that  may or may not include truths,  are used by the resonance strategy to direct the search for 
the information needed for ass ignment completion. In addit ion to discussing how one finds useful 
resonators, we detail various successes, in some of which the resonance strategy played a key role in 
obtaining a far better proof and in some of which the resonance strategy proved indispensable. The  
successes are taken from group theory, Robbins algebra, and various logic calculi. 
Keywords - -Automated  reasoning, Group theory, Logic calculi, Open questions, OTTER,  Reso- 
nance strategy, Robbins algebra. 
1. GENESIS  OF THE RESONANCE STRATEGY 
We at Argonne National Laboratory constantly seek a question or a problem that is currently out 
of reach of the most powerful automated reasoning program we have in hand, and then commence 
our attack. To this date, we have always used for such experiments a program we have designed 
and implemented. Our goal is, on the one hand, to bring the question or problem within reach of 
our program and, on the other hand and more generally, to formulate a new strategy, inference 
rule, or methodology that produces the success. We then test the new strategy, inference rule, or 
methodology on related problems and then on unrelated problems. Many of our contributions to 
automated reasoning can be traced directly to applying the cited approach; see [1, Chapter 2] for 
appropriate anecdotes, and see [2] for recent successes. Indeed, this article typifies our preferred 
approach to research in automated reasoning, research that continues to extend the Argonne 
paradigm for the automation of logical reasoning (presented in detail in [3]). 
This  work was supported by the Office of Scientific Comput ing,  U.S. Depar tment  of Energy~ under Contract  
W~31-109-Eng-38. 
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To enable researchers to experience and test the power of the cited paradigm, we include various 
input files for the study of various areas of mathematics and logic. Each of the input files can be 
put to a broad use by appropriate modification of its elements, commenting out or commenting 
in various options. To comment out an element, one simply places a "%" before the element o 
be ignored by McCune's program OTTER [4]. To comment in an option so that it can be used, 
one simply removes the "%" that prevents its use. As a further aid to accessing the material in 
this lengthy paper, the following map is in order. 
Section 1.1 answers the natural question concerning the original motivation for the research 
reported here, research that culminated in Experiment 0 (presented in Section 1.2) that gave birth 
to the resonance strategy and to the concept of resonator (defined formally in Section 2). To 
provide a comparison with more familiar notions, in Section 1.3 we discuss the concept~of resonator 
as a generalization of the concept of lemma (so frequently used in mathematics). In Section 1.4, 
we offer 68 theorems (or theses) that serve well for evaluating new ideas, new approaches, and 
new reasoning programs, and in Section 1.5, we offer some experimental results that preceded the 
formulation of the resonance strategy. A comparison of these early results with successes obtained 
with the use of the resonance strategy strongly suggests the power offered by the strategy. To 
complete the picture, we then turn, in Section 2, to the resonance principle and (as promised) 
the formal definition of a resonator so central to the resonance strategy. 
Because we continually seek to encourage the use of McCune's program OTTER,  Section 3 
is devoted to various features of this program. There we briefly touch on representation (in 
Section 3.1) and lists for presenting a question or problem, strategy (in Sections 3.2 and 3.4) 
for controlling reasoning, and (in Sections 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6) a means (weighting) for imposing 
the researcher's knowledge and intuition on a program's actions. Of the various inference rules 
OTTER offers for drawing conclusions, the only one that is featured is paramodulation (in Sec- 
tion 3.8), for the actions of this inference rule (more than those of any other rule) are far more 
complex. Sections 3.7 and 3.9 are devoted, respectively, to other OTTER commands and to 
source material for learning more about this program. 
To provide hard evidence for the value of using the resonance strategy, we turn to its iterative 
use in Section 4 for the study of two-valued sentential (or propositional calculus) and to its use 
in Sections 5 and 6, respectively, for the study of Robbins algebra and group theory. These uses 
of the resonance strategy might be termed static, as opposed to its dynamic use as discussed 
in Section 2. As further evidence of the power offered by the resonance strategy, we turn in 
Section 7 to its use for completing elegant proofs, especially in the context of seeking shorter 
proofs. There we discuss various aspects of elegance, including that of compactness, a property 
that may never have been the object of previous research. To stimulate research, we also offer 
(in Section 7.1) a question focusing on shorter proofs--a question that nicely complements hat 
(posed in Section 5) which is still open concerning Robbins algebra--and (in Section 7.2) feature 
a charming proof (of a deep theorem in many-valued sentential calculus), a proof that avoids the 
use of terms of a certain type. We conclude the section with a brief discussion (in Section 7.3) of 
various practical aspec~ ~'~ focus on circuit design and on algorithm synthesis. 
1.1. Scot t ' s  Cha l lenge  
The genesis of the research reported in this article was a set of 68 theorems from two-valued sen- 
tential (or propositional) calculus [5] suggested by D. Scott [6]; see Section 1.4 for the 68 theorems, 
which Lukasiewicz calls theses and which throughout this article we sometimes call theorems and 
sometimes call theses. An axiomatization for this area of logic consists of the following three 
formulas in which the function i can be interpreted as "implication" and the function n can be 
interpreted as "negation." 
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(Li) 
(L2) 
(h3) 
i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z))) 
i(i(n(x),x),x) 
i(x,i(n(x),y)) 
An axiom set is complete for two-valued sentential calculus if the set of formulas that can be 
deduced from it with the use of condensed etachment (defined and illustrated shortly) and 
instantiation is precisely the set of formulas (in effect, unit clauses) that are true under all 
assignments of true and false, with implication and negation used as logicians use these terms. 
Scott (in effect) issued a challenge to our automated reasoning program OTTER [4] by asking 
how many of the 68 theorems (given in Section 1.4) it could prove, using as axioms L1,L2, 
and L3; see [7] for additional detail and related items. In contrast to that earlier paper in 
which we presented a 30-step proof establishing that the Lukasiewicz axiom system (consisting 
of theses L1, L2, and L3) implies the Church axiom system (consisting of theses 18, 35, and 49), 
in Section 7.1 we present shorter proofs--indeed, three different proofs, each of length 22. 
With my colleague W. McCune (author of OTTER),  the challenge was accepted. Of espe- 
cial interest to us was our lack of familiarity with two-valued sententiat calculus and with the 
Lukasiewicz axiom system. From the viewpoint of research, more important han the excitement 
produced by using our program in a new area was the fac~ that any successes would clearly be free 
'~f the justifiable concern that we might have substantially aided the program, even if unwittingly. 
As evidence of our lack of knowledge and bias, when we began our attack, we did not even know 
that the 68 theorems are tightly coupled. Indeed, only after our formulation of the resonance 
strategy, which is the focus of this article, did we learn of the coupling. 
To instruct OTTER to attempt o prove the 68 theorems, we were fortunate in that the study 
of this area of logic often relies on the use of condensed etachment, an inference rule that can 
be applied by a reasoning program by using hyperresolution and the following clause, where 
"]"  means logical or  and " - "  means logical not.  Also, the predicate P can be interpreted as 
"provable" and the function i as "implication" (with i an encoding of ---~). 
The following clause is used with hyperresolution for 
condensed detachment. 
-P(i(x,y)) I -P(x) i P(y). 
Fo" this area of logic, condensed etachment considers two formulas, (A--+ B) and C--respectively 
caled the major and the minor premiss--and, if C unifies with A, yields the formula D, where D 
is ~btained by applying to B the most general unifier of C and A. (For the curious, and consistent 
with earlier publications, the word "premiss" is spelled as Church recommends.) Unification is a 
procedure that considers two expressions and seeks to find the most general substitution of terms 
for variables that makes the two identical. Unification is the basis of many of the procedures 
applied by OTTER and, more generally, relied upon in automated reasoning (see [1,3]). 
Just for illustration, if one applies condensed etachment to 
i(x,i(x,i(y,y))) 
and 
i(z,z) 
with the second formula playing the role of C, one obtains 
i(i(z,z) ,i(y,y)). 
CAI#~ 29:2-J 
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If one reverses the roles of the two formulas and applies condensed etachment, one obtains a 
copy of the first formula. 
In addition to instructing OTTER to use hyperresolution, we relied on three of the program's 
features to begin our attack on the 68 theorems uggested by Scott. First, the researcher can 
assign a maximum to the number of proofs to be sought in a single run; in our case, we assigned 
the maximum to be infinity, for any given theorem might be proved more than once, making 
the assignment of 68 unwise. Second, one can place the denials of theorems under attack in a 
special ist, list(passive), to prevent heir playing any role in the reasoning other than ascertaining 
the completion of a proof. When having a program attempt o prove a number of independent 
theorems, a wise move is to prevent heir interaction. We did place the negation (or denial) of 
each of the 68 theorems in list(passive). Third, to ascertain which theorems had been proved while 
the run was in progress, we appended to each denial an ANSWER literal with the corresponding 
thesis number; Lukasiewicz calls the theorems under discussion theses. 
Consistent with our view that the use of strategy is crucial in almost all cases--both strategy 
to restrict a program's reasoning and strategy to direct i t - -we used the set of support strategy 
and weighting. For the set of support strategy, which restricts the reasoning by requiring that 
all conclusions that are drawn be recursively traceable to a designated input set (the initial set 
of support), we placed in list(sos) the three Lukasiewicz axioms L1,L2, and L3. Regarding 
weighting, which permits one to define the complexity of a conclusion to reflect one's knowledge 
and intuition and thus strongly influence OTTER's  choice of where next to focus attention, we 
simply used symbol count. After all, we had no knowledge of the field and certainly no intuition; 
therefore, the natural move was to instruct the program to choose as the next focus of attention 
the simplest available conclusion, where simplicity was measured in terms of symbol count. 
Our initial attack was indeed encouraging: In the first run, OTTER proved 37 of the 68 the- 
orems to be proved. However, essentially no additional progress was made until we turned to 
the use of a parallel version of OTTER (ROO), whose use eventually led to proofs of 48 of the 
68 theorems. We could get no further. Although proving 48 out of 68 theorems might be consid- 
ered as meeting the original Scott challenge moderately well, to be completely candid, we wished 
to send to Scott a more impressive total success. 
1.2. The  Resonance  St ra tegy  Is Born  
More than thirty years of experimentation with automated reasoning programs has strongly 
suggested that, sometimes, intuition or a guess without evidence should be boldly followed. Such 
a move is especially appealing because, when compared with research conducted by hand, one of 
the advantages of relying on the assistance of an automated reasoning program to investigate a 
wild guess is that the latter costs relatively little in time or energy. 
The hypothesis (or guess) that drove the next phase of the attack on the 68 theorems was to 
conjecture that, since they are all from the same field of logic, perhaps some (possibly strong) 
connection existed among them. Even if they were not connected, their shape or functional 
skeleton, ignoring variables, might hold an important clue for directing OTTER's  search for the 
desired 68 proofs. For a taste of what is meant by "shape" of a formula, we offer the following 
two expressions, which, though not identical, have the same shape. 
i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(i(y,x) ,i(y,z))) 
i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z))) 
The two cited formulas are in fact identical if one ignores the particular variables or, equivalently, 
considers the variables to be indistinguishable. 
We then placed the clause equivalent of each of the 68 theorems in a list, which is called 
weight_list(pick_and_purge), that is used by OTTER to direct its search and also to decide which 
information to purge upon generation; we note that a more complete treatment of the subject 
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is given in Section 3.5. The placement of a formula in this list in no way asserts that the 
formula holds or is a valid lemma. The clause equivalent (for OTTER)  of each of the theorems 
is obtained by prefixing each with some predicate, say P, postfixing each with a period, and (of 
course) adding an additional opening and an additional closing parenthesis. We also assigned to 
each of the 68 clauses under discussion a weight of 2, causing the program to prefer for the focus 
of attention any retained formula that matched in shape (ignoring the specific variables present) 
any of the 68 formulas. By setting the maximum of the weight of retained formulas equal to 20, 
any deduced formula that matched in shape one of the 68 formulas under discussion was retained, 
for it was given a weight of 2. (The max_weight was set to 20 because the longest formula in 
symbol count among the 68 has length 20, when the predicate is counted.) Both for being chosen 
as the focus of attention to direct the reasoning and for deciding whether to be retained (rather 
than discarded), any other formula was given a weight equal to its symbol count. 
When OTTER executed the new approach of directing its search by keying on formulas that 
match in shape one of the 68 theorems to be proved, in a single run, all were proved in less than 
16 CPU-minutes on a SPARCstation l+- -and  the resonance strategy was born. (We shall refer 
to this experiment throughout his article as Experiment 0.) We thus had the first evidence of 
the potential power of using the resonance strategy, a strategy that enables the researcher to 
designate chosen formulas or equations to be of especial interest because of their symbol pattern 
(or shape), with variables ignored. However, when one learns as we later did that the 68 theses are 
in fact tightly coupled, one might have an immediate and justifiable concern that the program is 
(in effect) proof checking some larger result. This concern was expressed by one of my colleagues 
early in the study of this new resonance strategy. 
In Sections 4-7, we provide ample evidence to put this concern to rest. As part of that evidence, 
we discuss the case in which the use of resonators-- implemented with weight templates to direct 
the program's earch--that were taken from a theorem from Robbins algebra led to the discovery 
of a shorter proof of that same theorem. This success motivated a number of studies (cited in 
Sections 6 and 7) featuring the resonance strategy to seek proofs more elegant han previously 
known, studies that culminated in finding far shorter proofs in other areas that include group 
theory and logic calculi. 
1.3. Resonator  as Genera l i za t ion  of Lemma 
That  proof checking is not what is occurring is reinforced when one recalls that resonators 
are more general than are lemmas, for lemmas assert truths whereas resonators assert nothing. 
Resonators instead capture a set of statements, ome of which may in fact be false. To produce 
the set of statements captured by a given resonator R, one begins by noting that a resonator is a 
formula schema obtained from a formula or equation by replacing each variable occurrence in the 
formula or equation by *; the formal definition is given in Section 2. The statements captured 
by R are precisely those that can be obtained by replacing each occurrence of * by a variable, with 
no constraint placed on whether the variables must be distinct; indeed, the various occurrences 
of * in R can be assigned the same or different variable names. For example, where in Boolean 
groups--those in which the square of every x is the identity element e- - the lemmas yzyz  = e and 
yyzz  = e are such that neither generalizes the other, the resonator (formula schema) **** = e, by 
using each occurrence of "star" to assert he presence of some variable, generalizes and captures 
(in a manner that is discussed in this article) both lemmas. In contrast, among the equations 
captured by the resonator **** = e is the equation xxxy  = e, which is clearly not true in all 
Boolean groups. 
The inclusion of the following resonator (expressed in one of the acceptable ways to OTTER,  
where the function f denotes product and the occurrences of * have been replaced by arbitrarily 
chosen variable names) will ordinarily cause OTTER to prefer for the focus of attention equations 
such as yzyz  = e and yyzz  = e. 
weight ( f (x , f (y , f ( z ,x ) ) )  = e ,2 ) .  
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The point here is that OTTER treats all variables in a weight template (of the type just given) 
as indistinguishable or ignorable, other than recognizing them as variables. Of course, neither 
cited equation that might ordinarily be preferred will be retained, when deduced, if forward 
subsumption (defined in Section 3.7) is in use and the hypothesis xx  = e that defines Boolean 
groups is present. 
For a second example, let us consider some of the consequences of including the following 
resonator (expressed in OTTER notation), which corresponds to thesis 35 as numbered by 
Lukasiewicz. (Throughout his article, when we talk about a resonator that corresponds to 
some thesis or the like, we mean that it has the same shape or functional skeleton as does the 
thesis and that the particular variables that replace the occurrences of star are irrelevant. Fur- 
ther, we typically talk about the variables in a resonator, recognizing that, in a strict sense, the 
occurrences of star designate variable presence in that position.) For clarity, although the follow- 
ing expression is (as a formula presented in clause form) identical to thesis 35, as a resonator (in 
OTTER notation) the variables are ignored. 
weight (P (i(i(x, i (y,z)) ,i(i(x,y) ,i(x,z)))) ,2). 
Because a weight of 2 has been assigned to the template, any formula--in particular, the following 
two- - that  matches it in shape will be given preferential treatment for directing the program's 
reasoning. 
i (i (x,i(y,z)) ,i(i(y,x) ,i(y,z))) 
i(i(x, i(y,z)) ,i(i(x,y) ,i(x,z))) 
To mechanically test a formula or equation for possibly "matching" a resonator expressed in the 
star notation, one first replaces all occurrences of star with variables uch that no two variables 
are identical, and then one determines whether a renaming of the variables yields the formula or 
equation; if such a renaming exists, then the formula or equation matches a resonator. 
Because variables in a resonator (expressed in OTTER notation) are considered to be indis- 
tinguishable, both formulas are "captured" by the given resonator. In contrast, if one considers 
the corresponding clauses or (possible) lemmas, then the second of the two formulas, which itself 
is (in effect) identical to the given resonator, is not  captured or generalized by the first, nor is 
the first captured by the second. We again see how the concept of resonator is (in the illustrated 
sense) a generalization of the concept of lemma. We also see that resonators can be used to 
gu ide  a reasoning program's earch, a use that contrasts nicely with the use of lemmas as truths 
from which to reason.  If no statements that are true in the theory under study are captured by 
a given resonator, then, most likely, the inclusion of the resonator is pointless, for no deduced 
conclusion will match the resonator. On the other hand, if but a single deduced and retained con- 
clusion is captured by a resonator--and hence given preference dictated by the weight assigned 
to the resonator--the inclusion of that resonator can dramatically improve the effectiveness of 
the program. 
As contrasted with what one might call the syntactic sense, the concept of resonator also 
generalizes the notion of lemma in the following semantic sense. One distinction sometimes made 
between the concept of lemma and that of theorem is that the former is often not  of great interest 
in and of itself but, instead, is of interest for proving one or more theorems that are of interest in 
and of themselves. Resonators, by being used to increase the effectiveness of a program's earch, 
are also primarily of interest for their value in proving one or more theorems. Since a single 
resonator can capture (in the sense just discussed) a large set of lemmas, the concept of resonator 
generalizes that of lemma. Further, all consequences of a lemma obtained by substitution are 
true, for a lemma (to be accepted for a theory) must be true. In contrast, and as part of the 
generalization, a resonator may be such that some statements captured by it are false and some 
are true. 
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1.4. The  68 Theorems for S tudy  
For those who might wish to pursue appropriate research, the 68 theses, numbered according 
to the way Lukasiewicz numbered them, are the following; in particular, theses 1, 2, and 3 are, 
respectively, L1, L2, and L3. 
(thesis_4) 
(thesis_5) 
(thesis_6) 
(thesis_Z) 
(thesis_8) 
(thesis_9) 
(thesis_lO) 
(thesis_ll) 
(thesis_f2) 
(thesis_f3) 
(thesis_f4) 
(thesis_f5) 
(thesis_f6) 
(thesis_iT) 
(thesis_f8) 
(thesis_f9) 
(thesis_20) 
(thesis_21) 
(thesis_22) 
(thesis_23) 
(thesis_24) 
(thesis_25) 
(thesis_26) 
(thesis_27) 
(thesis_28) 
(thesis_29) 
(thesis_30) 
(thesis_31) 
(thesis_32) 
(thesis_33) 
(thesis_34) 
(thesis_35) 
(thesis_36) 
(thesis_37) 
(thesis_38) 
(thesis_39) 
(thesis_40) 
(thesis_41) 
(thesis_42) 
(thesis_43) 
(thesis_44) 
(thesis_45) 
(thesis_46) 
(thesis_47) 
(thesis_48) 
(thesis_49) 
i(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,y)),u),i(i(z,x),u)) 
i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z)))) 
i(i(x,y),i(i(i(x,z),u),i(i(y,z),u))) 
i(i(x,i(i(y,z),u)),i(i(y,v),i(x,i(i(v,z),u)))) 
i(i(x,y),i(i(z,x),i(i(y,u),i(z,u)))) 
i(i(i(n(x),y),z),i(x,z)) 
i(x,i(i(i(n(x),x),x),i(i(y,x),x))) 
i(i(x,i(i(n(y),y),y)),i(i(n(y),y),y)) 
i(x,i(i(n(y),y),y)) 
i(i(n(x),y),i(z,i(i(y,x),x))) 
i(i(i(x,i(i(y,z),z)),u),i(i(n(z),y),u)) 
i(i(n(x),y),i(i(y,x),x)) 
i(x,x) 
i(x,i(i(y,x),x)) 
i(x,i(y,x)) 
i(i(i(x,y),z),i(y,z)) 
i(x,i(i(x,y) ,y)) 
i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(y,i(x,z))) 
i(i(x,y) ,i(i(z,x) ,i(z,y) )) 
i(i(i(x,i(y,z)),u),i(i(y,i(x,z)),u)) 
i(i(i 
i(i(i 
i(i(i 
i(i(i 
i(i(i 
(x,y),x),x) 
(x,y),z),i(i(x,u) 
(x,y),z),i(i(z,x) 
(x,y),y),i(i(y,x) 
(i(x,y),y),z),i(i 
i(i(i(x,y),z),i(i(x,z) 
i(i(x,i(x,y)),i(x,y)) 
i(i(x,y),i(i(i(x,z),u) 
,i(i(u,y),z))) 
,x)) 
,x)) 
(i(y,u),x),z)) 
,z)) 
,i(i(y,u),u))) 
i(i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(i(x,u) ,i(i(u,z) ,z))) 
i(i(x,y) ,i(i(y,i(z,i(x,u))) ,i(z,i(x,u)))) 
i(i(x,i(y,i(z,u))) ,i(i(z,x) ,i(y,i(z,u)))) 
i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(i(x,y) ,i(x,z))) 
i(n(x) ,i(x,y)) 
i(i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(n(x) ,z)) 
i(i(x,n(x)) ,n(x)) 
i(n(n(x)) ,x) 
i(x,n(n(x))) 
i(i(x,y) ,i(n(n(x)) ,y)) 
i(i(i(n(n(x)) ,y) ,z) ,i(i(x,y) ,z)) 
i(i(x,y) ,i(i(y,n(x)) ,n(x))) 
i(i(x,i(y,n(z))) ,i(i(z,y) ,i(x,n(z)))) 
i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(i(n(z) ,y) ,i(x,z))) 
i (i (x, y), i (n(y) ,n(x) ) ) 
i(i(x,n(y)) ,i(y,n(x))) 
i(i(n(x) ,y) ,i(n(y) ,x)) 
i(i(n(x) ,n(y)) ,i(y,x)) 
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( thes is_50)  
( thes is_51)  
( thes i s_52)  
( thes is_53)  
( thes i s_54)  
( thes i s  55) 
( thes is_56)  
(~hesis_57) 
( thes i s_58)  
( thes i s_59)  
( thes i s_60)  
( thes i s_61)  
( thes i s_62)  
( thes i s_63)  
( thes i s_64)  
( thes i s_65)  
( thes i s_66)  
( thes is_67)  
( thes is_68)  
( thes i s_69)  
( thes is_70)  
(thesis_Y1) 
i (i (i (n(x) ,y) ,z) ,i (i(n(y) ,x) ,z)) 
i (i (x, i (y,z)), i (x,i(n(z) ,n(y)))) 
i(i(x,i(y,n(z))),i(x,i(z,n(y)))) 
i(i (n(x) ,y) ,i(i(x,y) ,y)) 
i(i (x,y) ,i(i(n(x) ,y) ,y)) 
i(i (x,y), i (i (x,n(y)) ,n(x))) 
i(i (i(i (x,y) ,y) ,z) ,i(i(n(x) ,y) ,z)) 
i(i(n(x),y),i(i(x,z),i(i(z,y),y))) 
i(i(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(y,z) ,z)) ,u) ,i(i(n(x) ,z) ,u)) 
i (i (n(x) ,y), i(i(z,y), i (i (x,z) ,y)) ) 
i(i(x,i(n(y),z)),i(x,i(i(u,z),i(i(y,u),z)))) 
i(i (x,y) ,i(i(z,y) ,i(i(n(x) ,z) ,y))) 
i (i (n(n(x)) ,y), i(x,y)) 
i(x,i(y,y)) 
i(n(i(x,x)) ,y) 
i(i(n(x),n(i(y,y))),x) 
i(n(i(x,y)) ,x) 
i (n(i (x, y) ) ,n(y) ) 
i (n(i (x,n(y))), y) 
i(x,i(n(y) ,n(i(x,y)))) 
i(x,i (y,n(i(x,n(y))))) 
n(i(i(x,x),n(i(y,y)))) 
1.5. Preliminary Experimental Resu l ts  
It seems clear that virtually any data that strongly promotes erious experimentation i  au- 
tomated reasoning merits inclusion in an article of this type. In that regard, the following is a 
list of the 37 theses (by number) that were proved in a single OTTER run before the resonance 
strategy was formulated, the run cited in Section 1.1. 
04 05 06 09 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
30 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 48 49 50 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 71 
The cited theses were not proved in the order given. For thesis 10, the program found three 
proofs. When the original attack was revisited on a SPARCstation 2 (during the writing of this 
article), thesis 50 was the last of the 37 that was proved, requiring approximately 287 CPU- 
seconds and completing upon retention of a clause numbered 47404. The run was terminated 
when the assigned limit of 24 megabytes of memory was reached. 
When the resonance strategy was then used by keying on the 68 theses to be proved, and 
when all other parameters were kept the same, OTTER proved all 68 theses in a single run (see 
Experiment 0 cited in Section 1.2). When the experiment was revisited on a SPARCstation 2 
(during the writing of this article), the last thesis to be proved was thesis 71 in approximately 
397 CPU-seconds after retention of a clause numbered 32257. Among the sharp differences with 
and without the resonance strategy, thesis 71 was proved without the use of the strategy in 
approximately 69 CPU-seconds after retention of a clause numbered 7689. The fact that the 
use of the resonance strategy sometimes costs CPU time is expected, for the search space is 
dramatically perturbed by assigning a low weight (high priority) to formulas that match an 
included resonator. For but one example, thesis 7 would ordinarily be assigned a weight of 20, 
if symbol count was the rule for priority assignment. With the resonance strategy, thesis 10 was 
proved six times, and thesis 17 was proved twice. 
To further encourage research with the program OTTER,  we include the following input file for 
the study of two-valued sentential calculus. In Section 3, we focus on the use and meaning of the 
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commands ~und in this file. For the researcher who wishes to avoid using the resonance strateg~ 
it suffices to place a "%" be~re each of the 68 templates found in the weightAist(pick_and_purge). 
Otherwise, if the input file is used as given, the resulting experiment will duplicate our use of 
the resonance strategy in the cited context. (In the ~llowing file, "1" denotes logic~ or, " - "  
denotes logical not,  and, with the exception of the clauses that mention Scott, the clauses that 
mention a person's name correspond to known axiom systems for two-valued sentential calculus; 
those that mention Scott were included in order to answer que~ions he posed.) 
Input  Fi le for S tudy ing  Two-Va lued  Sentent ia l  Calculus 
set (hyper  res ) .  
assign(max_weight,20). 
assign(max_proofs, 0). 
clear(print_kept). 
clear(for_sub). 
clear(backsub). 
assign(max_seconds, 1200). 
assign(max mem, 24000). 
assign(report, 900). 
assign(max_distinct_vars, 4). 
assign(pick_given_ratio, 3). 
set(order_history). 
set(input_sos_first). 
set(sos_queue). 
set(print_level). 
weight_list(pick_and_purge). 
Following are templates corresponding to the 68 theses to be proved. 
welght(P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,y)),u),i(i(z,x),u))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z))))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,y),i(i(i(x,z),u),i(i(y,z),n)))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(i(y,z),u)),i(i(y,v),i(x,i(i(v,z),u))))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(z,x) ,i(i(y,u) ,i(z,u))))),2). 
we ight (P (i (i ( i (n (x), y), z), i (x, z) ) ), 2). 
weight(P(i(x,i(i(i(n(x) ,x),x) ,i(i(y,x) ,x)))) ,2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(i(n(y),y),y)),i(i(n(y),y),y))),2). 
weight 
weight 
wezght 
weight 
weight 
weight 
welght 
weight 
weight 
welght 
welght 
weight 
weight 
weight 
welght 
welght 
(P (i (x, i(i(n(y) ,y) ,y))) ,2). 
(P (i(i (n(x) ,y) ,i(z,i(i (y,x) ,x)))) ,2). 
(P(i(i(i(x,i(i(y,z) ,z)) ,u), i(i(n(z) ,y) ,u))) ,2). 
(P (i (i(n(x) ,y) ,i(i(y,x) ,x))) ,2). 
(P(i(x,x)) ,2). 
(P (i(x, i(i(y,x) ,x))) ,2). 
(P(i(x,i(y,x))),2). 
(P(i (i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(y,z))) ,2). 
(P (i (x,i(i (x,y) ,y))) ,2). 
(P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(y,i(x,z)))),2). 
(P (i (i (x,y), i(i(z,x) ,i(z,y)))) ,2). 
(P (i (i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,u) ,i(i(y,i(x,z)) ,u))) ,2). 
(P (i (i(i(x,y) ,x) ,x)) ,2). 
(P(i(i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(i(x,u) ,i(i(u,y) ,z)))),2). 
(P(i(i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(i(z,x) ,x))) ,2). 
(P(i(i(i(x,y) ,y) ,i(i(y,x) ,x))) ,2). 
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welght (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P ( i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
welght (P(i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P(i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
weight (P (i 
(i(i(i(x,y),y),z),i(i(i(y,u),x),z))),2). 
(i(i(x,y),z),i(i(x,z),z))),2). 
(i(x,i(x,y)),i(x,y))),2). 
(i(x,y),i(i(i(x,z),u),i(i(y,u),u)))),2). 
(i(i(x,y),z),i(i(x,u),i(i(u,z),z)))),2). 
(i(x,y),i(i(y,i(z,i(x,u))),i(z,i(x,u))))),2). 
(i(x,i(y,i(z,u))),i(i(z,x),i(y,i(z,u))))),2). 
(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))),2). 
(n(x),i(x,y))),2). 
(i(i(x,y),z),i(n(x),z))),2). 
(i(x,n(x)),n(x))),2). 
(n(n(x)),x)),2). 
(x,n(n(x)))),2). 
(i(x,y),i(n(n(x)),y))),2). 
(i(i(n(n(x)),y),z),i(i(x,y),z))),2). 
(i(x,y),i(i(y,n(x)),n(x)))),2). 
(i(x,i(y,n(z))),i(i(z,y),i(x,n(z))))),2). 
(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(n(z),y),i(x,z)))),2). 
(i(x,y),i(n(y),n(x)))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,n(y)),i(y,n(x)))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(n(x),y),i(n(y),x))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))),2). 
welght (P(i(i(i (n(x) ,y) ,z) ,i (i(n(y) ,x) ,z))) ,2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(x,i(n(z) ,n(y))))),2). 
welght (P (i (i(x,i (y,n(z))) ,i(x,i(z,n(y))))) ,2). 
wexght(P(i(i(n(x),y),i(i(x,y),y))),2). 
weight(P(i(i(x,y),i(i(n(x),y),y))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(x,y),i(i(x,n(y)),n(x)))),2). 
wexght(P(i(i(i(i(x,y),y),z),i(i(n(x),y),z))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(n(x),y),i(i(x,z),i(i(z,y),y)))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),z)),u),i(i(n(x),z),u))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(n(x),y),i(i(z,y),i(i(x,z),y)))),2). 
wexght(P(i(i(x,i(n(y),z)),i(x,i(i(u,z),i(i(y,u),z))))),2). 
wexght(P(i(i(x,y),i(i(z,y),i(i(n(x),z),y)))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(n(n(x)),y),i(x,y))),2). 
welght(P(i(x,i(y,y))),2). 
welght(P(i(n(i(x,x)),y)),2). 
wexght(P(i(i(n(x),n(i(y,y))),x)),2). 
welght(P(i(n(i(x,y)),x)),2). 
wexght(P(i(n(i(x,y)),n(y))),2). 
wexght(P(i(n(i(x,n(y))),y)),2). 
wexght(P(i(x,i(n(y),n(i(x,y))))),2). 
wexght(P(i(x,i(y,n(i(x,n(y)))))),2). 
welght(P(n(i(i(x,x),n(i(y,y))))),2). 
end_of_list. 
list(usable). 
The following clause is used with hyperresolution for 
condensed detachment. 
-P(i(x,y)) I -P(x) I P(y). 
The following disjunctions, except those mentioning Scott, 
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% are the negation of known axiom systems. 
-P(i(p,i(q,p))) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) I -P(i(n(n(p)),p)) 
-P(i(p,n(n(p)))) I -P(i(i(p,q),i(n(q),n(p)))) I 
-P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(q,i(p,r)))) I 
$ANSWER(step_allFrege_i8_35_39_40_46_2i). % 2i is dependent. 
-P(i(p,i(q,p))) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(q,i(p,r)))) I 
-P(i(i(q,r),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) I -P(i(p,i(n(p),q))) I 
-P(i(i(p,q),i(i(n(p),q),q))) I -P(i(i(p,i(p,q)),i(p,q))) I 
$ANSWER(step_allHilbert_i8_2i_22_3_54_30). % 30 is dependent. 
-P(i(p,i(q,p))) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) I 
-P(i(i(n(p),n(q)),i(q,p))) I $ANSWER(step_allBEH_Church_FL_i8_35_49). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(q,r))) I -P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(n(p),r))) I 
-P(i(i(n(p),r),i(i(q,r),i(i(p,q),r)))) I $ANSWER(step_allLuka_x_19_3759). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(q,r))) I -P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(n(p),r))) 
-P(i(i(s,i(n(p),r)),i(s,i(i(q,r),i(i(p,q),r))))) I 
$ANSWER(step_alIWos x_19_37 60). 
-P(i(i(p,q),i(i(q,r),i(p,r)))) I -P(i(i(n(p),p),p)) i 
-P(i(p,i(n(p),q))) I $ANSWER(step_allLuka_i_2_3). 
-P(i(p,p)) I -P(i(p,i(q,p))) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(q,i(p,r)))) 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),p),p)) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) I 
-P(i(n(n(p)),p)) I -P(i(p,n(n(p)))) I -P(i(i(p,q),i(n(q),n(p)) 
$ANSWER(step_allScott_orig_16_18_2124_35_39_40_46). 
) I 
-P(i(p,p)) I -P(i(p,i(q,p))) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(q,i(p,r)))) 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),p),p)) I -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) I 
-P(i(n(n(p)),p)) i -P(i(p,n(n(p)))) I -P(i(i(n(p),n(q)),i(q,p) 
$ANSWER(step_allScott origO_i6_18 21 24_35_39_40_49). 
) I 
end of list. 
list(sos). 
The following three are Luka, i 2 3. 
P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
P(i(i(n(x),x),x)). 
P(i(x,i(n(x),y))). 
The following are from Frege, 18 85 21 46 39 40, with 21 dependent. 
P(i(x,i(y,x))). ~ axiom FI. 
P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))). ~ axiom F2. 
P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(y,i(x,z)))). ~ axiom F3. 
P(i(i(x,y),i(n(y),n(x)))). ~ axiom F4. 
P(i(n(n(x)),x)). ~ axiom F5. 
P(i(x,n(n(x)))). ~ axiom f6. 
end_of_list. 
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list (passive) . 
-P (i (i (i (i (q,r), i(p,r)) ,s), i (i(p,q) ,s))) 
-P(i(i 
-P(i(i 
-P(i(i 
-P(i(i 
-P(i(i 
-P(i(p 
-P(i(i 
J $ANS(neg_th_04). 
(p,i(q,r)),i(i(s,q),i(p,i(s,r))))) I $ANS(neg_th_05). 
(p,q),i(i(i(p,r),s),i(i(q,r),s)))) I $ANS(neg_th_O6). 
(t,i(i(p,r),s)),i(i(p,q),i(t,i(i(q,r),s))))) I $ANS(neg_th_O7) 
(q,r),i(i(p,q),i(i(r,s),i(p,s))))) I $ANS(neg_th_08). 
(i(n(p),q),r),i(p,r))) i $ANS(neg_th_09). 
,i(i(i(n(p),p),p),i(i(q,p),p)))) I $ANS(neg_th_lO). 
(q,i(i(n(p) ,p) ,p)) ,i(i(n(p) ,p) ,p))) I $ANS(neg_th_ll). 
-P(i(t,i(i(n(p),p),p))) [ $ANS(neg_th_12). 
-P(i(i(n(p),q),i(t,i(i(q,p),p)))) I $ANS(neg_th_13). 
-P(i(i(i(t,i(i(q,p),p)),r),i(i(n(p),q),r))) I $ANS(neg_th_14). 
-P(i(i(n(p),q),i(i(q,p),p))) J $ANS(neg_th_15). 
-P(i(p,p)) J $ANS(neg_th_16). 
-P(i(p,i(i(q,p),p))) i $ANS(neg_th_lT). 
-P(i(q,i(p,q))) f $ANS(neg_th_18). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(q,r))) i $ANS(neg_th_19). 
-P(i(p,i(i(p,q),q))) ; $ANS(neg_th_20). 
-P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(q,i(p,r)))) f $ANS(neg_th_21). 
-P(i(i(q,r),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) f $ANS(neg_th_22). 
-P(i(i(i(q,i(p,r)),s),i(i(p,i(q,r)),s))) f $ANS(neg th_23). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q) ,p) ,p)) J $ANS(neg_th_24). 
-P(i(i(i(p,r),s),i(i(p,q),i(i(q,r),s)))) [ $ANS(neg_th_25). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(i(r,p),p))) J $ANS(neg_th_26). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),q),i(i(q,p),p))) i $ANS(neg th 27). 
-P(i(i(i(i(r,p) ,p) ,s) ,i(i(i(p,q) ,r) ,s))) i $ANS(neg th_28). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(i(p,r),r))) I $ANS(neg_th_29). 
-P(i(i(p,i(p,q)),i(p,q))) i $ANS(neg_th_30). 
-P(i(i(p,s),i(i(i(p,q),r),i(i(s,r),r)))) f $ANS(neg_th_81). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(i(p,s),i(i(s,r),r)))) i $ANS(neg_th_32). 
-P(i(i(p,s),i(i(s,i(q,i(p,r))),i(q,i(p,r))))) i $ANS(neg_th_33). 
-P(i(i(s,i(q,i(p,r))),i(i(p,s),i(q,i(p,r))))) J $ANS(neg_th_34). 
-P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r)))) i $ANS(neg_th_85). 
-P(i(n(p),i(p,q))) i $ANS(neg_th_36). 
-P(i(i(i(p,q),r),i(n(p),r))) I $ANS(neg_th_37). 
-P(i(i(p,n(p)),n(p))) ; $ANS(neg_th 38). 
-P(i(n(n(p)),p)) ; $ANS(neg_th_39). 
-P(i(p,n(n(p)))) I $ANS(neg_th 40). 
-P(i(i(p,q),i(n(n(p)),q))) I $ANS(neg_th_41). 
-P(i(i(i(n(n(p)),q),r),i(i(p,q),r))) J $ANS(neg_th_42). 
-P(i(i(p,q),i(i(q,n(p)),n(p)))) J $ANS(neg_th_43). 
-P(i(i(s,i(q,n(p))),i(i(p,q),i(s,n(p))))) J $ANS(neg th_44). 
-P(i(i(s,i(q,p)),i(i(n(p),q),i(s,p)))) i $ANS(neg_th_45). 
-P(i(i(p,q),i(n(q),n(p)))) f $ANS(neg th_46). 
-P(i(i(p,n(q)),i(q,n(p)))) i $ANS(neg th 47). 
-P(i(i(n(p),q),i(n(q),p))) i $ANS(neg_th_48). 
-P(i(i(n(p),n(q)),i(q,p))) I $ANS(neg_th_49). 
-P(i(i(i(n(q) ,p) ,r) ,i(i(n(p) ,q) ,r))) I $ANS(neg_th_50). 
-P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(p,i(n(r),n(q))))) ; $ANS(neg th_51). 
-P(i(i(p,i(q,n(r))),i(p,i(r,n(q))))) i $ANS(neg_th_52). 
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-P(i(i(n(p),q),i(i(p,q),q))) [ SANS(neg_th_53). 
-P ( i ( i (p ,q ) , i ( i (n (p ) ,q ) ,q ) ) )  ] SANS(neg_th_54). 
-P ( i ( i (p ,q ) , i ( i (p ,n (q) ) ,n (p ) ) ) )  I $ANS(negth_55).  
-P ( i ( i ( i ( i (p ,q ) ,q ) , r ) , i ( i (n (p ) ,q ) , r ) ) )  I SANS(neg_th_56). 
-P ( i ( i (n (p ) , r ) , i ( i (p ,q ) , i ( i (q , r ) , r ) ) ) )  ] SANS(neg th_57) .  
-P(i(i(i(i(p,q),i(i(q,r),r)),s),i(i(n(p),r),s))) I $ANS(neg_th_58). 
-P(i(i(n(p),r),i(i(q,r),i(i(p,q),r)))) ] SANS(neg_th_59). 
-P(i(i(s,i(n(p),r)),i(s,i(i(q,r),i(i(p,q),r))))) ] SANS(neg_th_60). 
-P(i(i(p,r),i(i(q,r),i(i(n(p),q),r)))) I SANS(neg_th_61). 
-P(i(i(n(n(p)),q),i(p,q))) I SANS(neg_th_62). 
-P(i(q,i(p,p))) ] SANS(neg_th_63). 
-P(i(n(i(p,p)),q)) ] SANS(neg_th_64), 
-P(i(i(n(q),n(i(p,p))),q)) I SANS(neg_th_6S). 
-P(i(n(i(p,q)),p)) ] SANS(neg_th_66). 
-P(i(n(i(p,q)),n(q))) I SANS(neg_th_67). 
-P(i(n(i(p,n(q))),q)) i SANS(neg_th_68). 
-P(i(p,i(n(q),n(i(p,q))))) [ SANS(neg_th_69). 
-P(i(p,i(q,n(i(p,n(q)))))) ] SANS(neg_th_70). 
-P(n(i(i(p,p),n(i(q,q))))) [ SANS(neg_th_7i). 
end_of list. 
Z list (demodulators). 
(n(n(x)) = junk). 
(n(n(n(x))) = junk). 
(i(i(x,x),y) = junk). 
(i(y,i(x,x)) = junk). 
Z (i(junk,x) = junk). 
Z (i(x,junk) = junk). 
Z (n(junk) = junk). 
Z (P(junk) = ST). 
Y, end_of_list. 
2. THE RESONANCE PR INCIPLE  
As with many principles, the resonance principle is more a strong suggestion than a hard-and- 
fast rule. The principle asserts that formulas or equations found in proofs of theorems of a field 
provide useful resonators (formally defined shortly) for attempting to prove theorems from the 
same field. Captured as a special case is that of using as resonators steps of a proof of theorem T
to prove T. Perhaps unexpected-- it  was for us when first tr ied--the special case of using the 
resonance strategy (defined in this section) does not necessarily simply reproduce the known 
proof but, instead, often produces a far more elegant proof (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 for some 
marked successes in that regard). 
DEFINITION. A resonator R is a formula schema obtained from a formula or equation by replacing 
each variable occurrence in the formula or equation by *. The resonator R implicitly represents 
the set of formulas or equations obtained by assigning a variable name to each occurrence of * 
in R; the represented set may include formulas or equations that are false in the theory under 
study. The various occurrences of * in R can be assigned the same or different variable names; 
no restriction on the assignment exists. To each resonator R is attached an integer w, called its 
value or weight, that reflects the conjectured importance of R. The smaller the value or weight 
of a resonator, the higher is its conjectured importance. Implicit in the definition of resonator is 
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the role the researcher plays, for, typically, it is the researcher who chooses the resonators and 
who assigns the value or weight to each resonator. 
Because, when expressed in OTTER notation (with * replaced by a variable), variables in a 
resonator are treated as indistinguishable and ignorable, a single resonator can capture a large 
set of statements, possibly including items that are false in the theory of mathematics or logic 
under study. (When we talk about the variables in a resonator, we recognize that, in a strict 
sense, the occurrences of star designate variable presence in that position.) For example, in 
Boolean groups, the resonator (expressed in OTTER notation) xyzx = e (the identity element) 
captures the equations yzyz = e and yyzz = e, both of which are (true) lemmas uch that neither 
generalizes the other. The given resonator also captures the equation xxxy = e, which is false in 
most Boolean groups. A Boolean group is a group in which the square of every element x is the 
identity e. Because variables are ignored (when OTTER examines them or examines any weight 
template), nothing different occurs if the given resonator is replaced by the resonator xxxx  = e 
or by the resonator xyzu = e. As discussed in some detail in Section 1.3, the concept of resonator 
is more general than is the concept of lemma in the sense that one resonator can capture many 
lemmas. Where a lemma in a theory is "true" in the theory, a resonator for a theory is not 
intended to take on the value t rue  or false. 
DEFINITION. The static resonance strategy, often referred to simply as the resonance strategy, is 
a direction strategy that relies on the use of resonators upplied by the researcher. 
Indeed, rather than being a restriction strategy for constraining a program's reasoning, the 
resonance strategy is a direction strategy for steering a program's reasoning by influencing it 
in its choice of where next to focus its attention. In this article, we present the results of 
OTTER's  use of the resonance strategy in studies focusing on areas of mathematics and logic 
including group theory, Robbins algebra, and various logic calculi. We have also formulated and 
experimented briefly with a companion to the resonance strategy. The companion strategy, called 
the resonance-restriction strategy, restricts a program's reasoning with resonators rather than 
directing its reasoning with resonators. The strategy rests on using the steps of a known proof 
to filter the set of deduced conclusions, retaining only those that (with variables ignored) match 
in shape one of the steps, but directing the search by symbol-count preference rather than by 
resonance. (A mechanical test for matching is given in Section 1.3.) 
In the future, in contrast o the static resonance strategy, we plan to investigate the case 
in which resonators are adjoined during a run, believing that the resulting dynamic resonance 
strategy might prove to be an extremely powerful strategy. One incarnation of the dynamic 
resonance strategy would add as resonators the proof steps of so-called lesser theorems of interest 
proved during the attack on a so-called greater theorem of interest, where the lesser theorems 
were included to enable the program to find possibly useful resonators. Even without access to 
an implementation f the dynamic resonance strategy, one can (as we have in many experiments) 
simulate its use; see Section 4. One begins with simple theorems and has OTTER obtain proofs 
of as many of them as the allotted CPU time and memory permit. From each completed proof, 
one then takes the proof steps, excluding those found in the input as axioms and the like, and uses 
them as resonators in the attempt o prove harder theorems. Further, as we show in Section 4, 
one can profitably iterate in the cited manner. The two-step and the iterated approach can each 
produce a valuable set of resonators for studying various aspects of the theory from which the 
selected theorems are taken, and it can at the same time produce valuable resonators for applying 
the resonance strategy in the pursuit of the proof of a very deep, purported theorem. 
Although in the context of the dynamic resonance strategy we have at this time little experi- 
mental evidence concerning the effectiveness of the cited two-step approach for accruing powerful 
resonators, in the context of the static resonance strategy we have much. In particular, we have 
used with great success a closely related variant of the approach for accruing resonators where 
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the goal was that of seeking more elegant proofs. In one study, we applied an iterative approach 
that began with a 33-step proof [5] of the completeness (for two-valued sentential calculus) of the 
axiom system consisting of L1, L2, and L3 (given in Section 1.1). (For computing the length of a 
proof, we ignore the axioms and count just the deduced steps; condensed etachment, defined and 
illustrated in Section 1.1, is the inference rule that is used in this area of logic.) The Lukasiewiez 
proof completes by deriving Church's axiom system consisting of theses 18, 35, and 49 (given in 
Section 1.4). With heavy use of the resonance strategy, we eventually found various 22-step roofs 
of the Church axiom system using condensed etachment; see Section 7.1. Whether a shorter 
proof exists is at this time unknown and is an interesting and challenging research question. 
3. A BR IEF  INTRODUCTION TO THE PROGRAM OTTER 
To aid the researcher in understanding more fully the successes obtained with McCune's pro- 
gram OTTER and to provide a small beginning for one who wishes to use this program, we now 
give a brief introduction to some of its features. A thorough treatment is provided in manual 
form in [4] and in book form in [3], the latter offering in Chapter 16 a tutorial for the use of 
OTTER. The following discussion will also add to one's understanding of the items found in the 
input file given in Section 1.5 and the input files given later in Sections 5, 6, and 7.2. 
3.1. P rob lem Representat ion  and Clause Lists 
Although OTTER accepts a number of notations, including first-order predicate calculus, we 
generally submit a question or problem to the program in the clause language. Examples of 
clauses are given in the input file of Section 1.5; recall that "1" denotes logical or, that " - "  
denotes logical and, and that all variables (such as x ,y ,z ,  and u) are implicitly universally 
quantified (meaning, for example, for all x). 
The clauses used to convey facts, relationships, equations, the assumed falseness of the con- 
clusion of a theorem to be proved, and such can be placed on any of four lists. \¥e place in 
list(sos) the clauses that the program (initially) selects from to drive its reasoning, and place in 
list(usable) clauses that can never be used in this manner. Clauses in list(usable) are used only 
to complete the application of an inference rule. For example, the following clause (for condensed 
detachment) is placed in list(usable), for the intention is that it never drive the reasoning. 
-P ( i (x ,y ) )  I -P(x) I P (y) .  
If one wishes OTTER to make a bidirectional search, reasoning forward from some information 
and backward from the assumed falseness of the theorem under study, then one places in list(sos) 
some or all of the clauses that convey the nature of the theory under study and the hypothesis of 
the theorem and some or all of the clauses that correspond to assuming the theorem false. How- 
ever, as evidenced in the input file of Section 1.5, if one intends that the clauses that correspond 
to assuming the theorem false play no active role in drawing conclusions, then they are placed 
in list(passive). As one sees, in our initial study of two-valued sentential calculus prompted by 
Scott's e-mail, we placed the negated (or denial) form of theses 4 through 71 in list(passive). 
The last of the four lists, list(demodulators), for receiving input clauses is typically used for rules 
(equations) for rewriting information into some desired canonical form. 
3.2. Rest r i c t ion  S t ra tegy  and D i rect ion  S t ra tegy  
As the presence of the four lists suggests, especially list(sos) to the researcher familiar with 
automated reasoning, OTTER offers the use of strategy. We have always maintained that, 
without the use of strategy, deep questions and difficult problems are in almost all cases out of 
reach of a reasoning program. Crucial is the use of two types of strategy, strategy that restricts 
the program's reasoning and strategy that directs it. Further, we maintain that, within these 
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two categories of strategy, tough assignments require for their completion a variety of each type. 
These views, supported by thirty years of experimentation, i  part explain our lack of enthusiasm 
for studying mathematics and logic with a paradigm offering little or no strategy, for example, a
paradigm such as that based on logic programming. 
Regarding strategy that restricts reasoning, as suggested by the name list(sos), we strongly 
prefer the use of the set of support strategy [1,3,8]. Intuitively, the set of support strategy 
requires one to choose a nonempty subset of the input clauses and restrict he reasoning to lines 
of inquiry that begin with a clause in the chosen subset. To use the set of support strategy, one 
partitions the set S of input clauses into two subsets, a nonempty subset T (called the initial 
set of support) and S - T; the latter may be empty. The set of support strategy restricts the 
application of an inference rule by disallowing application of the rule to sets of clauses consisting 
solely of clauses from the set S - T. Put another way, all newly retained clauses are added to T 
(the set of support), and each set of clauses to which an inference rule is applied must contain 
at least one clause in T. When the axioms of a theory are placed in list(usable) and not in 
list(sos), the program is prevented from exploring the theory as a whole and, instead, is more 
or less confined to focusing on the specific theorem under study. To answer an immediate and 
natural question arising from a glance at the input file in Section 1.5, we sometimes place axioms 
in list(sos), especially when we have little else to reason from. 
3.3. Weighting 
Even with an effective restriction strategy in use, a study benefits markedly from the use of 
one or more direction strategies. To direct a program's reasoning, at one end of the spectrum, 
one can use weighting [1,3,9], and at the other end of the spectrum, one can use level saturation 
(equivalently, breadth first). Weighting can be used to convey the researcher's notion regarding 
complexity preference. Where my colleague R. Overbeek, who formulated weighting, considers 
one of its uses to be that of circumscribing the terms that the researcher conjectures to play 
the important role in an assignment, we consider that function of weighting to be one of advice 
giving; weighting can also be used to discard deduced conclusions that are thought o be of no 
use. Indeed, we have always thought he object of including templates expressing preference of 
one function over another or of one combination of functions over another was to reflect intuition 
or knowledge. Regardless of the view, one's choice of weight emplates (if any) plays an important 
strategic role in directing the program's reasoning, in contrast o the use of the set of support 
strategy for restricting reasoning. 
By assigning low weights (high priorities) to various functions and combinations of functions, 
the researcher causes an automated reasoning program to prefer for the focus of attention con- 
clusions containing corresponding subterms. At the other end of the spectrum, the assignment 
of high weights (low priorities) causes the program to delay focusing on conclusions containing 
corresponding subterms. If one has no intuition or knowledge to be reflected with included weight 
templates, then the choice (for the program) of where next to focus attention can be based on 
symbol count. In that case, the program directs its search by selecting for the focus of attention 
the shortest clause that has not yet been used. If the computed weight of a deduced conclu- 
sion exceeds the assigned max_weight (limit on complexity of retained information), then the 
conclusion is immediately discarded. 
3.4. Level  Saturat ion  and the Rat io  S t ra tegy  
In contrast o the use of weighting is the use of level saturation. For this choice of directing 
the reasoning, one uses the command set(sos_queue), which causes the order of the selection (for 
the focus of attention) of retained conclusions to be based strictly on the order in which they 
are retained, first come first serve. In the vast majority of cases, we prefer the use of weighting 
(complexity preference) over that of level saturation. 
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However, because experimentation has showed the need for using clauses with heavy weight 
that are found rather early in OTTER's  attack--clauses whose weight delays for a long time 
or forever their being chosen as the focus of attention--we frequently prefer that the program's 
reasoning be directed by a combination of weighting and of level saturation. For that preference, 
we use the ratio strategy formulated by McCune. When one uses the ratio strategy, one assigns a 
value to its parameter (pick_given_ratio) for determining how much the program is to be directed 
by weighting and how much by level saturation. For example, by assigning pick_given_ratio to 3, 
OTTER is instructed to focus on three conclusions (from among those retained) based on their 
weight or complexity, one by first come first serve, then three, then one, and the like. Though 
not basing our action on a thorough analysis of which value is most effective for assigning to the 
pick_given_ratio parameter, we note that we frequently use the value 3. If an examination of an 
output file suggests that too much of the program's attention is focused on first come first serve 
clauses, then one increases the pick_given_ratio, perhaps to 6. If too little time is spent on such 
clauses, then one decreases the pick_given_ratio to 2 or even to 1. 
3.5. We ight  L ists  
To complete our introduction to the features of OTTER in the context of weighting, we men- 
tion the following three lists of interest: weight_list(pick_and_purge), weight_list(pick_given), and 
weight_list(purge_gen). Any weight templates included in the first list are used by the program 
both to direct its reasoning regarding where next to focus its attention and to affect its retention of 
drawn conclusions by measuring their respective desirability against he maximum (max_weight) 
allowed complexity. When a drawn conclusion fails to contain any subterms that match any of the 
included weight templates, its complexity is measured strictly in terms of symbol count. When 
the complexity of a drawn conclusion strictly exceeds the chosen max_weight, the conclusion is 
immediately purged. Weight templates included in the second list, weight_list(pick_given), are 
used only to direct the program's reasoning and have no effect on conclusion purging. Weight 
templates included in the third list, weight_list(purge_gen), are used only for conclusion purging 
and have no effect on directing the reasoning. 
A quick review of the preceding observations correctly suggests that the first list combines 
the functions of the second and third. The choice of which of the three lists to use depends 
on whether the researcher has advice to give regarding which terms merit the assignment of 
high priority (small weight) for influencing OTTER on where next to focus its attention, advice 
to give regarding which terms merit the assignment of such low priority that their presence 
strongly suggests purging the corresponding drawn conclusions, and advice to give regarding the 
separation of included hints. 
3.6. Examples  of  the  Use of We ight ing  
In view of the fact that our use of the resonance strategy with OTTER is via weighting, a 
few remarks and a few examples of the typical use of weighting are in order. First, we note that 
one could add the resonance strategy to a program that does not offer weighting (in its fullest). 
Indeed, this strategy is based on a program's ability to treat the researcher's chosen formulas and 
equations to be used as resonators (see the beginning of Section 2 for the definition) to direct 
the program's reasoning. What is required is the ability to compare the shape of each retained 
conclusion with all resonators (ignoring the variables of the conclusion and of the resonator being 
compared) and, if any match is found, assign to the conclusion the corresponding priority given 
by the researcher. We were fortunate in that McCune's implementation of Overbeek's weighting 
strategy is such that variables in a template are treated as indistinguishable. He could, instead, 
have chosen (as was the case in a prior reasoning program we used) to have distinct variables 
treated as distinct variables, for example, requiring that the variable x be treated only as x. 
150 L. Wos 
For a first example of the typical use of weighting, let the function inv denote inverse (as in 
a group). If the researcher conjectures that any term in inv merits strong consideration, the 
following template can be used. 
weight (inv(*0), I). 
In the presence of this template, OTTER will compute the weight of any term in inv by multi- 
plying the weight of its argument by 0 and adding I. If the weight of the constant a is l, then the 
assigned weight of inv(inv(a)) will be 1. If the researcher wishes terms in inv to be penalized, 
then two choices exist: the additive value can be changed from 1 to, say, 5, or the multiplier can 
be changed from 0 to, say, 2, or both. 
For a second example, let us assume that the researcher conjectures that terms free of variables 
are to be preferred and, as a consequence, wishes to penalize terms containing variables. The 
following template (or one like it) serves nicely. 
weight (x,3). 
Unless some interference occurs, OTTER will add 3 to the weight of a term for each variable 
present in the term. 
For a third example, let us assume that the researcher wishes the program to prefer for the 
focus of attention formulas whose "tail" is short, where the tail of a formula (for this discussion) 
is the second argument of the leftmost function i for implication. The following weight template 
is the one we use. 
weight (P(i(*l,*2)) ,i) . 
In the presence of this template, OTTER assigns a weight to each new conclusion by multiplying 
the weight of its first argument by 1, multiplying the weight of its second argument by 2, and 
adding 1 to the sum of the resulting products. McCune used this template in his application 
of his tail strategy to problems in equivalential calculus, where the function i is replaced by the 
function e for equivalence. When we used the recursive tail strategy [10] in our study of two-valued 
sentential (or propositional) calculus, we used the following closely related template. 
weight (i (*i, *2), I). 
In the presence of this last template, the program gives (recursive) preference to formulas that 
have a short tail regardless of how deep in the formula the short tail is. 
3.7. Add i t iona l  Commands  and  Opt ions  
To extend our brief treatment of some of the OTTER options, we focus on the following 
commands found in the input file given in Section 1.5. 
assign(max_proofs, 0). 
~, assign(max_distinct vars, 4). 
~, clear(for_sub). 
clear (back_sub). 
The first of the given four commands  assigns to the program the max imum number of proofs to 
be sought. When its value is set to 0, then no limit is placed on the number of proofs. Were 
it instead set, say, to 3, then the completion by OTTER of a third proof would terminate the 
run. Of course, before the desired number of completed proofs has been reached, a run may be 
terminated by a max imum placed on CPU time to be used or a max imum placed on memory  to 
be used. No  test is made to see whether more than one proof proves the same theorem. 
Of the four commands  under discussion, the second (commented out) is pertinent to a some- 
times used but unnamed restriction strategy. If one removes the comment (%) and uses the 
The Resonance Strategy 151 
command as given, OTTER is restricted in its retention of deduced conclusions by requiring that 
each contain no more than four distinct variables. This restriction strategy is of particular use 
when experiments suggest hat the space of conclusions that can be drawn is large, for example, 
when one conjectures that long formulas must be used, in turn requiring the assignment of a high 
max_weight. 
To understand the use of the final two (of the four given) commands, we need a definition. 
The clause A subsumes the clause B if and only if a uniform replacement of terms for variables 
in A yields a (not necessarily proper) subclanse of B. Forward subsumption, which is abbre- 
viated for_sub, is the procedure OTTER employs to purge a newly generated conclusion when 
a subsuming clause already exists in the database of retained information. Without the use of 
forward subsumption, the researcher or program will almost always drown in redundant conclu- 
sions. Back subsumption is the procedure used to purge an existing conclusion when a newly 
deduced conclusion captures it as a corollary. When seeking proofs shorter than one has in hand, 
OTTER offers the use of ancestor subsumption. By definition, the clause A ancestor-subsumes 
the clause B if and only if (1) A properly subsumes B or (2) A and B are alphabetic variants 
and the derivation length of A is less than or equal to that of B. The question of whether the 
conclusion A subsumes, properly subsumes, or ancestor subsumes the conclusion B focuses on 
a relation that may or may not hold; in contrast, forward and back subsumption are procedures 
used to possibly purge conclusions. 
3.8. Paramodulat ion,  Equality, and Inference Rules 
As for inference rules for drawing conclusions, OTTER offers quite a number, including binary 
resolution, hyperresolution, UR-resolution, and paramodulation [1,3], the latter generalizing the 
usual notion of equality substitution. By using paramodulation coupled with demodulation, 
OTTER offers the researcher the use of a Knuth-Bendix approach to proving theorems; see 
Sections 6 and 7. For a complex example of paramodulation--one that shows why a person 
might not enjoy applying this rule by hand--we consider the inference rule applied to both the 
equation x + ( -x )  = 0 and the equation y + ( -y  + z) = z; the application yields, in a single step, 
the conclusion y + 0 = - ( -y ) .  In clause form, from 
EQUAL ( sum (x, minus (x)), O) 
into 
EQUAL (sum (y, sum (minus (y), z) ), z) 
the clause 
EQUAL (sum (y, 0) ,  minus (minus (y) ) ) 
is obtained by paramodulation. 
To see that this last clause is in fact a logical consequence of its two parents, one unifies the ar- 
gument sum(x,minus(x)) with the term sum(minus(y),z), applies the corresponding substitution 
to both the from and into clauses, and then makes the appropriate term replacement justified by 
the typical use of equality. The substitution found by the attempt o unify the given argument 
and given term requires ubstituting minus(y) for x and minus(minus(y)) for z. To prepare for 
the (standard) use of equality in this third example--and here we encounter a key feature of 
paramodulation--a nontrivial substitution for variables in both the from and the into clauses is 
required, which illustrates how paramodulation generalizes the usual notion of equality substitu- 
tion. In contrast, in the standard use of equality substitution, one does not apply a nontrivial 
replacement for variables in both the from and the into statements. 
In addition to using the set of support strategy, which is a general strategy designed to restrict 
the application of any inference rule, an automated reasoning program (such as OTTER) can 
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also use a number of other strategies that are specific in that they are designed to restrict the 
application of paramodulation. First, the program can be restricted from paramodulating from 
or into a variable. This restriction prevents a myriad of conclusions from being drawn. Such 
a restriction strategy is, in most cases, mandatory. After all, paramodulating f rom or into a 
variable will always yield a conclusion, since the corresponding unification can never fail. Second, 
the program can be required to paramodulate only from a specified side of each equality. In some 
cases, all applications of paramodulation are required to be from the left side only; in others, all 
are required to be from the right only. 
3.9. Sources  for Add i t iona l  In fo rmat ion  
The preceding material provides the merest hint of the versatility, usefulness, and power offered 
by McCune's program OTTER.  In the book [3], one gains a far greater appreciation for this 
program. The book also includes a tutorial (in Chapter 16) for using OTTER,  as well as a 
diskette containing the appropriate manuals, test problems, source code, and load modules (for 
personal computers). We have found OTTER to be an excellent assistant for research. For but 
one example, as may be clear at this point, OTTER's  treatment of variables in weight templates 
made it trivial to experiment with the resonance strategy to determine its potential. Let us now 
turn to some of those experiments, pecifically, to those experiments motivated by the writing of 
this article. 
4. AN ITERAT IVE  USE OF  THE RESONANCE STRATEGY 
In Sections 1.1 and 1.2, we discussed Scott's challenge and our response culminating in the for- 
mulation of the resonance strategy. In particular, we noted that, without the resonance strategy, 
37 of 68 target heorems were proved in a single run with OTTER and, with the use of the strategy, 
all 68 were proved in a single run on the first attempt. In that success, which we called Experi- 
ment 0 in Section 1.2, all 68 theorems were used as resonators in the weight_list(pick_and_purge), 
each assigned a weight of 2. In Section 1.5, we supplied an appropriate input file for the researcher 
who wishes to duplicate our experiments both before and after the formulation of the resonance 
strategy. 
Viewing the cited use of the resonance strategy as a limiting case, we were (during the writing 
of this article) curious about the results of so-called intermediate points. Specifically, we decided 
to experiment with an iterative use of the strategy. The plan was to start (with Experiment 1) 
by repeating the experiment that produced the 37 proofs, use as resonators in Experiment 2 the 
union of the proof steps of the proofs obtained in Experiment 1, use as resonators in Experiment 3
the union of the proof steps of the proofs obtained in Experiment 2, and continue in this manner. 
In the attempt o somewhat isolate the effects of using the strategy, the plan also called for no 
other changes to be made in the parameters. We thought it highly likely that a comparison of 
two proofs of the same theorem obtained in succeeding runs would show that OTTER was not 
proof checking: Two different proofs would be obtained, in many cases. By executing the cited 
plan, we were in part gathering evidence of the value of using as resonators the steps of the proof 
of one theorem in the attempt o prove a related theorem. We were also simulating (in a not 
totally satisfactory manner) the use of the dynamic resonance strategy; see Section 2. 
In Experiment 1, the following 37 theses were proved. 
04 05 06 09 10 11 12 13 15 16 1Y 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
30 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 48 49 50 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 7i 
When we took the union of the steps from the 37 proofs, ignoring the input (hypotheses), we 
obtained 83 resonators for Experiment 2. Experiment 2 yielded proofs of the following 52 theses. 
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04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 30 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 45 46 47 48 49 
50 51 52 53 54 56 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
Also proved in the experiment was the axiom system of Hilbert, which consists of six theses, 
3, 18, 21, 22, 30, and 54 (of which 30 is dependent on the other five members). (For computing the 
length of a proof, we ignore the axioms and count just the deduced steps; condensed etachment 
is the inference rule that is used in this area of logic.) As evidence that OTTER is not simply 
reproducing the proofs found in Experiment 1 (as in proof checking), note that, of the 37 theses 
proved in common, in Experiment 2 the proof length did not change in eleven of them, the proof 
length increased in four of them, and the proof length decreased in twenty-two f them. (Where 
a thesis was proved more than once, for comparison we took the shortest proof in each case.) The 
theses in which the proof length increased in Experiment 2 when compared with Experiment 1
are 11, 12, 13, and 63; in each case, the proof length increased by 1. Those in which the proof 
length decreased are theses 10, 15, 17 through 24, 30, 36 through 42, 48 through 50, and 62. 
Among the highlights, the length of the proof of thesis 10 was decreased from 13 to 4, of thesis 15 
from 30 to 17, and of thesis 50 from 41 to 31. 
For Experiment 3, we took the union of the (deduced) proof steps of the 52 proofs obtained 
in Experiment 2 to use as resonators. The union consists of 90 formulas, of which 14 do not 
match in functional shape any of the 83 resonators used in Experiment 2. Of the remaining 
76 formulas, 68 are identical (at the entire formula level) to one of the 83 resonators, and 8 match 
at the resonator level but not at the entire formula level. The use of the 90 resonators (from 
Experiment 2) in Experiment 3 yielded 58 of the sought-after 68 proofs, the following theses. 
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 30 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 56 57 59 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 
68 69 70 71 
When the proofs that are obtained in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 are compared by 
length, one finds that Experiment 3 finds 15 of shorter length, 19 of longer length, and 18 of 
unchanged length. 
In Experiment 4, we took the union of the (deduced) proof steps of the 58 proofs completed 
with Experiment 3, obtaining 99 formulas to use as resonators. Of the 99, 85 are identical to 
one of the 90 resonators used in Experiment 3, 8 differ (at the entire formula level) but match 
as resonators, and 6 do not match, even at the resonator (functional shape) level. Using the 
99 resonators, Experiment 4 yielded proofs of all but thesis 35. We were in no way surprised, 
for earlier experiments had produced abundant evidence that thesis 35 resists proof and resists 
it well, if the resonance strategy is not used. Experiment 4 also yielded a complete proof of an 
alternative axiom system (of Lukasiewicz) for two-valued sentential calculus, that consisting of 
theses 19, 37, and 59. 
In Experiment 5, we took the union of the (deduced) proof steps of the 67 proofs completed 
with Experiment 4, obtaining 127 formulas to use as resonators. Of the 127, 97 are identical to 
one of the 99 resonators used in Experiment 3, 25 differ (at the entire formula level) from each 
of the 99 but match as resonators, and 5 do not match, even at the resonator (functional shape) 
level. With the 127 resonators, Experiment 5 proved thesis 35, and the iterative approach yielded 
the desired 68 proofs. Also proved with that experiment was yet another axiom system for the 
calculus, namely, that consisting of theses 19, 37, and 60, discovered in our earlier research [7]. 
Valuable information concerning the use of the resonance strategy can be extracted from a com- 
parison of data produced by Experiment 5, in which 127 resonators are used, with Experiment 0, 
in which the 68 theses are used as resonators. First, one finds that the proof of thesis 35 obtained 
with Experiment 5 required approximately 227 CPU-seconds on a SPARCstation 2, completing 
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with the retention of a clause numbered 18774. In sharp contrast, the use of the 68 theses as 
resonators (see Section 1.2) yielded a proof of thesis 35 in approximately 36 CPU-seconds with 
the retention of a clause numbered 4978. Second, if one attempts to explain the marked differ- 
ence in the two experiments hat each prove thesis 35, one finds in their respective proofs a most 
interesting property. In particular, one finds that the last two steps of the proof completed in 36 
CPU-seconds have the same shape--both matching at the resonator level thesis 35--but such is 
not the case for the proof completed in 227 CPU-seconds. The two steps under discussion are the 
following (including the corresponding history for deducing each). When OTTER is instructed 
to use order_history, [hyper,l,j,k] means that the inference rule hyperresolution is used with 
clause (1) to capture condensed etachment, hat the clause numbered j is the major premiss 
unified with the first literal of (1), and that the clause numbered k is the minor premiss unified 
with the second literal of (1). 
2595 [hyper , l ,1471,1092]  P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(y,x),i(y,z)))). 
4978 [hyper,l,1192,2595] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))). 
As the following observations show, this second discovery (of the two cited proof steps) contains 
the needed clue for explaining why the experiment in which the 68 theses are used as resonators is 
far more successful at proving thesis 35. Since thesis 35 is among the 68 theses used as resonators, 
any formula that matches it in shape (ignoring variables) is given preferential treatment for being 
chosen as the focus of attention to drive the program's reasoning. Each of the resonators was 
assigned a weight of 2, and thesis 35 and formulas that match it in shape have a weight of 14 
if the weight is computed based on symbol count (including the predicate symbol). Therefore, 
the first of the cited formulas, clause (2595), is quickly chosen as the focus of attention because 
of being given a weight of 2. This situation contrasts harply with Experiment 5 where, as the 
evidence strongly suggests, the weight of 14 delays the choice of clause (2595) as the focus of 
attention. By quickly choosing clause (2595) to drive OTTER's reasoning, as the ancestor history 
shows, clause (4978) is deduced, and that clause is in fact thesis 35. As a side effect of the delay 
in choosing clause (2595) to drive the reasoning, Experiment 5 completes a 56-step proof, where 
the more successful experiment (Experiment 0) completes a 42-step proof. 
Showing how complicated is both the activity of proving deep theorems and the analysis of 
which parameters tell the relevant story, we note that the level of the 56-step proof is 18, and 
the level of the 42-step proof is 20. The level of an input statement (hypothesis) is defined to 
be 0, and the level of a deduced conclusion is one greater than the maximum of the levels of 
its immediate parents or ancestors. For example, let A0, B0, and CO be (input) axioms and 
hence of level 0; of level 1, let A1 be deduced from A0 and B0, and let B1 be deduced from B0 
and CO; and of level 2, let A2 be deduced from A1 and B1. Where A2 is a theorem of interest, 
by definition, its proof level is 2, and its proof length is 3; length in this report does not include 
(input) hypotheses. 
Summarizing, one sees that the inclusion of thesis 35 as a resonator did cause OTTER to focus 
on a formula similar in shape, using that formula to markedly aid its attempt o complete a proof 
of thesis 35. When thesis 35 is not included as a resonator (as is the case in Experiment 5), the 
program follows a sharply different path to completing the desired proof. Indeed, a glance at the 
following two clauses, which are the last two steps of the proof produced by Experiment 5, shows 
how different he path is. 
15795 [hyper,l,10712,7025] P(i(i(x,i(y,i(z,u))),i(i(z,x),i(y,i(z,u))))). 
18774 [hyper,l,15795,1912] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))). 
Obviously, clause (15795), which is used to deduce thesis 35, does not match in shape thesis 35 
even at the resonator level. 
We thus have an illustration of a strategy for increasing the effectiveness of the reso- 
nance strategy: Include among the resonators the correspondent(s) of the theorem(s) 
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to be proved. In addition, effectiveness ometimes i increased by also including as 
resonators the hypotheses of thc study. 
We conducted one final experiment, Experiment 6. For resonators, we took the 125 distinct 
proof steps from the 68 proofs produced by Experiment 5. Since Experiment 5 used 127 resonators 
taken from the union of the proof steps from Experiment 4, and since Experiment 4 did not yield 
a proof of thesis 35 but Experiment 5 did, Experiment 5 clearly found some shorter proofs. Of 
the 125, 120 match identically one of the 127 resonators used in Experiment 5, 4 match at the 
resonator level but not at the entire formula level, and 1 matches at neither the entire formula level 
nor the resonator level. We were certain that Experiment 6would yield complete proofs of various 
axiom systems for two-valued sentential calculus, those given in the input file of Section 1.5. The 
key is the presence among the resonators of that which captures at the functional or skeletal shape 
thesis 35. Indeed, when OTTER deduces thesis 35, its presence as a resonator (with low weight) 
predictably causes the program to quickly choose thesis 35 as the focus of attention, which in 
turn quickly leads to completing proofs for axiom systems in which thesis 35 is a member. If one 
takes the union of the proof steps of the proofs produced with Experiment 6, one obtains 126 
distinct steps, of which 2 fail to be identical to any of the 125 resonators that are used; however, 
each of the two steps in question does match in shape a resonator. 
There remained the question, How different would the proofs be produced by Experiment 6
when compared with the proofs produced by Experiment 0 in which the resonators are just those 
corresponding (in shape) to the 68 theses under study? Table 1 compares the results of the two 
experiments. 
Table 1. Comparison ofproofs. 
Experiment 6 Experiment 0 
Thesis 35 
Proof length a 45 42 
Level 15 20 
Hilbert system 
Time 64 CPU-sec 27 CPU-sec 
Length 47 45 
Level 14 19 
Alt. Lukasiewicz system 
Time 60 CPU-sec 35 CPU-sec 
Length 41 41 
Level 14 19 
Wos system 
Time 105 CPU-sec 76 CPU-sec 
Length 43 43 
Level 14 20 
Church system 
Time 109 CPU-sec 78 CPU-sec 
Length 46 42 
Level 15 20 
Frege system 
Time 78 CPU-sec 109 CPU-sec 
Length 54 47 
Level 15 20 
aBoth proofs complete with the same last two steps, 
those matching in shape thesis 35. 
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5. ROBBINSALGEBRA 
In this section, we briefly illustrate the value of using the resonance strategy for seeking shorter 
proofs where the focus is on Robbins algebra. This particular study broadens the scope of using 
the resonance strategy, for the treatment of Robbins algebra is purely in terms of equality--  
condensed etachment and hyperresolution play no role and are replaced by the inference rule 
paramodulation; see the example of paramodulation in action given shortly, the example discussed 
in more detail in Section 3.8. Part of the interest in Robbins algebra rests with the following 
question, still open: Is every Robbins algebra a Boolean algebra? This question was studied in 
some depth by A. Tarski and by his students, as we learned in a phone conversation with him. 
It is known that every finite Robbins algebra is Boolean. 
Paramodulation [1,3] is the only inference rule in use. For an example of the latitude permitted 
in the use of paramodulation--an example showing how this inference rule generalizes the usual 
notion of equality substitution--we consider the following three clauses and apply paramodu- 
lation from the first into the second to yield the third; from the viewpoint of mathematics, 
pararnodulation applied to both the equation x + ( -x )  = 0 and the equation y + ( -y  + z) = z 
yields in a single step the conclusion y + 0 = - ( -y ) .  
EQUAL (sum(x, minus (x)), 0). 
EQUAL (sum(y, sum(minus (y), z) ), z). 
EQUAL (sum(y, 0), minus (minus (y)) ). 
Where "+" can be interpreted as addition (or, more familiarly in the context of Boolean 
algebra, as union) and the function n as negation or complement, the following three axioms 
(expressed in yet another form acceptable to OTTER)  characterize Robbins algebra. 
EC](+(x, y) ,+(y,x)). 
EQ(+(+(x,y) ,z) ,+(x,+(y,z))). 
EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(x,n(y))))),x). Z Robbins axiom 
The first two axioms respectively express the properties of commutativity and associativity of 
union. The third axiom expresses an identity in terms of union and complement. All three 
properties hold in Boolean algebra. Regarding the cited open question, no finite counterexarnple 
(or model) can be found, for there exists a rather straightforward proof asserting that finite 
Robbins algebras are Boolean. One therefore has two choices to settle the open question: Find 
an infinite model that is a Robbins algebra and that violates one of the known properties of 
Boolean algebra, or prove that Robbins implies Boolean. 
We learned of the open question in the early 1980s from a colleague, S. Winker. He had been 
attempting, without gaining any valuable information, to use one of the Argonne automated 
reasoning programs to obtain a proof (rather than a model to serve as a counterexample). We 
suggested that he use what might be termed binary chop: Select some property of Boolean algebra 
often associated with an axiom set, adjoin the chosen property to the Robbins axioms, and then 
see whether the remaining properties of a Boolean algebra could be proved. When asked for 
a good candidate, we suggested the addition of the union of x and x = x. Winker succeeded, 
proving that the addition of this axiom to those of a Robbins algebra guarantees that the resulting 
algebra is Boolean. He continued to follow our suggestion of binary chop and obtained numerous 
intriguing results, some with the program by itself, some with the team of him and the program, 
and some with his insight alone. For example, the addition to the Robbins axioms of a 0 yields 
Boolean; the addition of a 1 yields Boolean; the addition of an axiom that asserts the existence 
of two elements c and d such that the union of c and d = d suffices; for the Winker successes, 
see [11,12]. 
The last of the cited results is most fascinating, for it does indeed appear to be a weak assump- 
tion. Before Winker proved the corresponding theorem, he proved that the addition of an axiom 
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asserting the existence of an element c with the union of c and c = c suffices. This theorem is the 
focus of this section, in the context of finding shorter proofs by relying on the resonance strategy. 
With the following input file, whose weight templates (which will be seen to serve nicely as res- 
onators) could be commented out by placing % in column 1, one can have OTTER prove that the 
adjunction of +(c, c) -- c to the Robbins axioms is sufficient o prove Huntington's axiom. Hunt- 
ington's axiom together with commutativity and associativity of + suffice to characterize Boolean 
algebra. Without using the resonance strategy, OTTER produces a 41-step proof (Proof 1 given 
shortly) from which one can extract the positive equalities, including those arising from back 
demodulation, to use as resonators, those resonators found in the weightAist(pick_and_purge) in 
the input file given shortly. When these are used as resonators, OTTER then obtains a 31-step 
proof (Proof 2 given shortly). In other words, again one has an example of an action that, from 
a casual perspective, is simply in the spirit of proof checking: one expects the program to repro- 
duce the proof just found--but it fails to do so. Instead, a substantially shorter proof is found, 
with the only change in the input being the use of the resonance strategy, keying on the steps 
of a known proof, Proof 1. Note that the command set(knuth_bendix) in the following input file 
instructs OTTER to attack the theorem under study with an approach that emphasizes the roles 
of paramodulation and demodulation, in a manner familiar to researchers who focus on complete 
sets of reductions. 
Input  Fi le for S tudy ing  Robb ins  A lgebra  
set  (knuth bendix) .  
set (index_f or_back_demod) . 
set (dynamic_demod lex_dep) . 
set (lex_rpo) . 
set (process input) . 
set (display terms). 
clear (pr intkept) .  
clear (print_new_demod) . 
clear (print_back demod) . 
assign(report, 60). 
assign(max_weight, 20). 
assign (max_mem, 8000). 
lex([A, B, C, D, E, F, g(x), n(x), +(x,x)]). 
i rpo_ir_status ( [+ (x, x) ] ). 
weight_l ist (pick_and_purge). 
°/o fol lowing are steps from a proof of +(c,c)=c, 
welght (EQ (+ (C,+(C,x)) ,+(C,x)), 2). 
welght (EQ (+ (C,+ (x,C)) ,+ (C,x)), 2). 
welght (EQ (+ (C,+ (x,+(y,C))) ,+(C,+(x,y))), 2). 
welght (EQ (+ (C,+ (x,+(C,y))) ,+(C,+ (x,y))) , 2). 
weight (EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)) ,n(+(C,n(+(x,C)))))) ,C) , 2) . 
weIght(EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)) ,n(+(C,n(+(C,x)))))) ,C) , 2) . 
welght (EQ (n(+(n(C),n(+(C,n(C))))),C), 2). 
weight (EQ (n(+ (n(+(x,y)) ,n(+(y,n(x))))) ,y), 2). 
weight (EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)) ,n(+(n(y) ,x)))) ,x) , 2) . 
weight (EQ(n(+(C,n(+(n(C) ,+(C,n(C)))))) ,n(C)) , 2) . 
welght (EQ (+ (C,+ (x,y)),+ (C,+(y,x))), 2). 
welght (EQ (n (+ (n (+ (C, +(x ,y) ) ) ,n(+ (C ,n (+ (y ,x) ) ) ) ) ) , C) , 
weight (EQ (n (+ (n (+ (C, x) ) ,n(+ (n(C) , + (x, C) ) ) ) ) , + (x, C) ) , 
weight (EQ (n (+ (n(+ (x, + (y, z) ) ),n (+ (z,n(+ (x, y) ) ) )) ), z), 
the union of c and c = c. 
2). 
2). 
2). 
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welght (EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(n(x) ,y)))),y), 2). 
wexght (EQ(n(+(n(+(x,n(y))) ,n(+(y,x)))) ,x), 2). 
welght (EQ (n (+ (n (+ (n (x), y) ), n (+ (y,x))) ), y), 2). 
welght (EQ(n(+ (n(+(x,+(y,z))) ,n(+(n(+(x,y)) ,z)))) ,z), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+ (n(+(x,C)) ,n(+ (C,n(+(C,x)))))) ,C), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+ (C ,n(+(C,+ (n(+ (C,x)) ,n(+ (x ,C) ) ) ) ) ) ) ,n(+ (x,C)) ) , 2) . 
welght (EQ (n(+(n(C) ,n(+(C,+(n(C) ,n(+(C,n(C)))))))) ,C), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+ (n(+(x,+ (y,z)) ) ,n(+ (y,n(+(x ,z) ) ) ) ) ) ,y), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+ (n(C) ,n(+(n(C) ,+(C,n(C)))))) ,C), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+ (n (C) ,+(C,n(C) ) ) ) ,n(+ (C,n(C)) )) , 2) . 
welght (EQ (n(+ (C,n(+ (C,n(C))))) ,n(C)), 2). 
welght (EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))) ,n(+(n(+(x,z)) ,y)))) ,y), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+ (x, C) ),n(+ (C,x))), 2). 
welght (EQ (n(+(x,+(y,C))) ,n(+ (C,+(x,y)))), 2). 
welght (EQ(n(+ (n(+(C,x)) ,n(+(C,+(n(C) ,x))))) ,+(x,C)) , 2). 
welght (EQ (n (+ (n (+ (C, x) ) ,n (+ (n (C), + (x, n (+ (C, n (C)) ) )) ) )) ,x), 2). 
welght (EQ (+ (C,n(+ (C,n(C)))), C) , 2). 
welght (EQ(+(C,+(x,n(+(C,n(C))))) ,+(C,x)), 2). 
welght (EQ (+ (x,n (+ (C,n(C)))),x), 2). 
weight (EQ (+ (n (+ (C,n(C)) ), x) ,x), 2). 
weight (EQ (n (+ (n (x) ,n (+ (C, + (x,n (C))) ) ) ), x), 2) . 
welght (EQ(n(+ (n(x) ,n(n(x)))) ,n(+(C,n(C)))) , 2). 
weight (EQ (n(+ (x,n(x))) ,n(+(C,n(C)))), 2). 
welght (EQ (n (n(+ (x,n(n(x))))) ,n(n(x))) , 2). 
weight (EQ(n(n(x)) ,x) , 2) . 
welght (EQ (+ (n(+ (y,x)) ,n(+(n(y) ,x))) ,n(x)), 2). 
end of list. 
list(usable). 
EQ(x,x). 
EQ(+(x,y),+(y,x)). 
EQ(+(+(x,y),z),+(x,+(y,z))). 
end of list. 
list(sos). 
EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(x,n(y))))),x). Z Robbins axiom 
EQ(+(C,C),C). % hypothesis 
-EQ(+(n(+(A,n(B))),n(+(n(A),n(B)))),B). % denial of Huntington axiom 
end_of_list. 
Z list(demodulators). 
Z (+(x,y) = +(y,x)). 
% (+(+(x,y),z) = +(x,+(y,z))). 
% (n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(x,n(y))))) = x). 
% (+(C,C) = C). % hypothesis 
% end_of_list. 
.... > UNIT CONFLICT at 
Z Robbins axiom 
Proof  1 in  Robb ins  A lgebra  
63 .07  sec  . . . .  > 909 [b inary ,908 ,1]  $F. 
Length of proof is 41. 
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PROOF 
I [] EQ(x,x). 
3,2 [] EQ(+(x,y),+(y,x)). 
5,4 [] EQ(+(+(x,y),z),+(x,+(y,z))). 
6 [] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(x,n(y))))),x). 
9,8 [] EQ(+(C,C),C). 
i0 [] -(EQ(+(n(+(A,n(B))),n(+(n(A),n(B)))),B)). 
12,11 [para_from,8,4] EQ(+(C,+(C,x)),+(C,x)). 
14,13 [para_into,ll,2] EQ(+(C,+(x,C)),+(C,x)). 
15 [para_into,13,4] EQ(+(C,+(x,+(y,C))),+(C,+(x,y))). 
18,17 [para_from,13,4,demod,5,5] EQ(+(C,+(x,+(C,y))),+(C,+(x,y))). 
19 [para_into,6,13] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)),n(+(C,n(+(x,C)))))),C). 
21 [para_into,6,11] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)),n(+(C,n(+(C,x)))))),C). 
23 [para_into,6,8] EQ(n(+(n(C),n(+(C,n(C))))),C). 
27 [para_into,6,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(y,n(x))))),y). 
31 [para_into,6,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(n(y),x)))),x). 
36,35 [para_from,23,6,demod,3] EQ(n(+(C,n(+(n(C),+(C,n(C)))))),n(C)). 
43 [para_into,15,2,demod,5,18] EQ(+(C,+(x,y)),+(C,+(y,x))). 
51 [para from,43,6] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,+(x,y))),n(+(C,n(+(y,x)))))),C). 
61 [para_into,27,13,demod,3] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)),n(+(n(C),+(x,C))))),+(x,C)). 
65 [para_into,27,4] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(z,n(+(x,y)))))),z). 
73 [para_into,27,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(n(x),y)))),y). 
77 [para_into,27,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,n(y))),n(+(y,x)))),x). 
99 [para_into,31,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(n(x),y)),n(+(y,x)))),y). 
i07 [para into,73,4] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(n(+(x,y)),z)))),z). 
149 [para_into,21,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,C)),n(+(C,n(+(C,x)))))),C). 
178,177 [para_from,149,27,demod,5,3] EQ(n(+(C,n(+(C,+(n(+(C,x)), 
n(+(x,C))))))) ,n(+(x,C))) . 
214,213 [para_into,51,23,demod,3,9,3] EQ(n(+(n(C),n(+(C,+(n(C), 
n(+(C,n(C)))))))) ,C) . 
219 [para_into,65,2] EO(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(y,n(+(x,z)))))),y). 
233 [para_into,65,35,demod,3,12,3] EQ(n(+(n(C),n(+(n(C),+(C,n(C)))))),C). 
244,243 [para_from,233,99,demod,3,36] EQ(n(+(n(C),+(C,n(C)))),n(+(C,n(C)))). 
249 [back_demod,35,demod,244] EQ(n(+(C,n(+(C,n(C))))),n(C)). 
277 [para_into,107,2] EO(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(n(+(x,z)),y)))),y). 
315 [para_into,219,19,demod,3,178] EQ(n(+(x,C)),n(+(C,x))). 
334,333 [para into,315,4] EQ(n(+(x,+(y,C))),n(+(C,+(x,y)))). 
337 [back_demod,61,demod,334] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)),n(+(C,+(n(C),x))))),+(x,C)). 
418,417 [para into,277,23,demod,3] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)), 
n(+(n(C) ,+(x,n(+(C,n(C)))))))) ,x) . 
441 [para_into,337,249,demod,214,3] EQ(+(C,n(+(C,n(C)))),C). 
453 [para_from,441,17,demod,14] EQ(+(C,+(x,n(+(C,n(C))))),+(C,x)). 
482,481 [para_from,453,77,demod,3,3,418] EQ(+(x,n(+(C,n(C)))),x). 
496,495 [para_into,481,2] EO(+(n(+(C,n(C))),x),x). 
510,509 [para_from,481,219,demod,3] EQ(n(+(n(x),n(+(C,+(x,n(C)))))),x). 
513 [para_from,481,99,demod,496,3] EQ(n(+(n(x),n(n(x)))),n(+(C,n(C)))). 
765 [para_into,513,509,demod,510] EQ(n(+(x,n(x))),n(+(C,n(C)))). 
828,827 [para_from,765,99 ,demod, 3,496] EQ (n(n(+ (x ,n(n(x) ) ) ) ) ,n(n(x) ) ) . 
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830,829 [para_from,Z65,99,demod,3,482,828] EO(n(n(x)) ,x) .  
895,894 [para_into,829,73] EQ(+(n(+(y ,x ) ) ,n (+(n(y ) ,x ) ) ) ,n (x ) ) .  
908 [back_demod,lO,demod,895,830] -(EQ(B,B)). 
Clause (908) contradicts clause (1), and the proof is complete. 
Proof  2 in Robbins Algebra 
.... > UNIT CONFLICT at 12.38 sec .... > 477 [binary,476,1] $F. 
Length of proof is 31. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  PROOF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
1 [] EO(x,x). 
3,2  [] EO(+(x ,y ) ,+(y ,x ) ) .  
5 ,4  [] Eq(+(+(x ,y ) , z ) ,+(x ,+(y ,z ) ) ) .  
6 [] EQ(n(+(n(+(x ,y ) ) ,n (+(x ,n (y ) ) ) ) ) ,x ) .  
8 [] EO(+(C,C),C). 
i0 [] -(EQ(+(n(+(A,n(B))),n(+(n(A),n(B)))),B)). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
13 [para_into 6,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(y,n(x))))),y). 
17 [para into 6,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(n(y),x)))),x). 
21 [para_into 13,4] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(z,n(+(x,y)))))),z). 
25 [para_into 13,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,y)),n(+(n(x),y)))),y). 
29 [para_into 13,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,n(y))),n(+(y,x)))),x). 
47 [para_into 17,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(n(x),y)),n(+(y,x)))),y). 
55 [para_into 21,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(y,n(+(x,z)))))),y). 
83 [para_into 55,2,demod,5] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(x,n(+(z,y)))))),x). 
85 [para_into 55,2] EQ(n(+(n(+(x,+(y,z))),n(+(n(+(x,z)),y)))),y). 
115 [para_from,8,47,demod,3,3] EQ(n(+(n(C),n(+(C,n(C))))),C). 
122,121 [para_from,8,4] EO(+(C,+(C,x)),+(C,x)). 
123 [para_from,l15,83,demod,3,3] EQ(n(+(C,n(+(n(C),+(C,n(C)))))),n(C)). 
136,135 [para_from, l15,85,demod,3] EQ(n(+(n(+(C,x)), 
n (+ (n(C) , +(x,n(+ (C,n(C)))))))) ,x). 
172,171 [para into,J21,2] EQ(+(C,+(x,C)),+(C,x)). 
196,195 [para from,123,55,demod,i22,3] EQ(n(+(n(C),n(+(n(C),+(C,n(C)))))),C). 
200,199 [para_from,123,29,demod,3,i96] EO(n(+(n(C),+(C,n(C)))),n(+(C,n(C)))). 
215 [back_demod,123,demod,200] EQ(n(+(C,n(+(C,n(C))))),n(C)). 
218,217 [para_into,135,8] EQ(n(+(n(C),n(+(n(C),+(C,n(+(C,n(C)))))))),C). 
231 [para_from,lTi,29,demod,3,3] E~(n(+(n(+(C,x)),n(+(n(C),+(x,C))))),+(x,C)). 
237 [para_from,171,4,demod,5,5] EQ(+(C,+(x,+(C,y))),+(C,+(x,y))). 
271 [para_into,231,215,demod,3,218,3] EQ(+(C,n(+(C,n(C)))),C). 
293 [para_from,271,23Z,demod,172] EQ(+(C,+(x,n(+(C,n(C))))),+(C,x)). 
328,32? [para_from,293,29,demod,3,3,136] EQ(+(x,n(+(C,n(C)))),x). 
342,341 [para_into,327,2] EQ(+(n(+(C,n(C))),x),x). 
354,353 [para from,327,55,demod,3] EQ(n(+(n(x),n(+(C,+(x,n(C)))))),x). 
357 [para_from,327,29,deraod,342,3] EQ(n(+(n(x),n(n(x)))),n(+(C,n(C)))). 
369 [para_into,357,353,demod,354] EQ(n(+(x,n(x))),n(+(C,n(C)))). 
412,411 [para_from,369,47,demod,3,328] EQ(n(n(+(x,n(n(x))))),x). 
416,415 [para_from,369,4Z,demod,3,342,412] EQ(n(n(x)),x). 
467,466 [para_into,415,25] EQ(+(n(+(y,x)),n(+(n(y),x))),n(x)). 
436 [back_demod, 10, demod, 467,416] - (EQ (B, B) ) . 
Clause (476) contradicts clause (1), and the proof is complete. 
6. GROUP THEORY 
In this section, the focus is on group theory, mainly studying the use of the resonance strategy 
for seeking shorter proofs when applied to theorems concerned with single axioms. Even though 
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dependency exists among them, for the axioms for a group, we prefer the set consisting of left 
and right identity with the identity denoted by e, left and right inverse, and associativity. The 
axioms of right identity and right inverse, for example, can be deduced from the remaining set of 
axioms. We also prefer the study of group theory to be made with the use of the inference rule 
paramodulation [1,3], which necessitates the inclusion of a clause for reflexivity of equality. We 
typically use the following clauses with f denoting product and g denoting inverse. 
Left identity: 
(1) EQUAL(f (e,x) ,x). 
Right identity : 
(2) EQUAL(f (x, e) ,x). 
Left inverse: 
(3) EQUAL(f(g(x),x),e). 
Right inverse : 
(4) EQUAL(f(x,g(x)),e). 
Associat ivity : 
(5) EQUAL(f(f(x,y),z),f(x,f(y,z))). 
Reflexivity : 
(6) EQUAL(x,x). 
We were motivated to make these studies in part by our colleague McCune. He had used 
OTTER in an impressively successful search for single axioms for groups and for varieties of 
groups [13]. A variety of groups is the set of all groups that satisfy the usual axioms for a group 
and also satisfy one or more additional equations. For example, if one adds the equation asserting 
that xy -- yx for all x and y, one obtains the variety of groups known as commutative, or Abelian, 
groups. If, instead, one adds the equation asserting that the square of every x is the identity e, 
one has the variety of groups known as Boolean groups, or groups of exponent 2. For an equation 
to be a single axiom for a given variety, one must be able to deduce from it the usual axioms 
for a group (or their equivalent) as well as the additional equation(s) that define the variety, 
and one must also be able to prove that the proposed axiom is satisfied by all members of the 
variety. Especially regarding the latter property, one rejects a candidate single axiom when one 
can prove properties that are too strong. For example, for the variety of groups in which one 
adds the equation asserting that the square of x commutes with the square of y, being able to 
prove commutativity from a proposed single axiom shows that the candidate must be rejected, 
for there exist groups in the variety under discussion that are not commutative, which in turn 
implies that the proposed axiom is not true for all members of the variety. McCune's intriguing 
results caused us to join him in the use of his program to extend the study to additional varieties; 
we succeeded. 
When by e-mail the preceding paragraph was sent to K. Kunen, he replied [14] with the 
following important distinctions, giving the computer science perspective in comparison with the 
mathematical perspective. In particular, Kunen remarked that although the paragraph is logically 
correct, it fails to accurately capture what is done by him and by us when studying such problems. 
Next, Kunen noted that satisfaction by all members of the variety is equivalent to deducibility of 
the proposed single axiom from the usual axioms for group theory together with the equation(s) 
that define the variety. In contrast o the spirit of the preceding paragraph, our approach is 
"generate and test," generating candidates that obviously do satisfy all of the members of the 
variety. (For example, McCune had OTTER take the axioms for a group and the defining equation 
and deduce a large set of conclusions from which he selected those he thought promising.) We 
accept a candidate single axiom if we can prove the needed properties from it, and we reject 
a candidate if we can find an appropriate model to serve as a counterexample. Models and 
counterexamples are found with Slaney's program FINDER [15], with Prolog programs written 
for that objective, and with the researcher's intuition. Kunen summarized by noting that, since 
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we consider only those candidates that are satisfied by all members of the variety under study, 
we never reject a candidate because of being too strong but, instead, reject it because of being 
too weak. 
In addition to the given motivation, we were quite curious about the usefulness of the resonance 
strategy for seeking shorter proofs for theorems in group theory. In particular--especially since 
the resonance strategy was developed exclusively in the context of the study of logic calculi, 
where equality (in the manner discussed here) plays no role--would the methodology apply well 
to problems in which equality is the only relationship resent? 
The area of study concerns the variety of groups of exponent 3, those in which the cube of 
every element x is the identity e. Although McCune had mainly sought single axioms in which 
the identity is present implicitly, in deference to our preference he then initiated the search for 
single axioms in which the identity e is present explicitly. He had OTTER assist in finding 
good candidates and then, for each, study it to see whether the appropriate theorems could be 
proved. For exponent 3 groups--as the input file given shortly shows--one is asked to prove that 
associativity holds (for multiplication), that the element e is in fact a two-sided identity, and 
that the cube of every element x is e. No need exists for considering the inverse property, for the 
square of x is the inverse of x in the variety under discussion. Among OTTER's successes, the 
following equation (expressed as a clause with the function f denoting product) was proved to 
be a single axiom for groups of exponent 3. 
EQ(f (x , f  (f (x , f  (f (x,y) ,z))  , f  (e , f  ( z , z ) ) ) )  ,y) .  
In other words, where the function f denotes multiplication, OTTER proved (in less than 2 CPU- 
seconds) from the given single equation that the constant e is a two-sided identity (ex = x = xe),  
that multiplication is associative, and that the cube of every x is e. From the viewpoint of 
automated reasoning, since paramodulation is the inference rule in use, the input also contains a
clause for reflexivity, x = x. 
For our study of the variety of groups of exponent 3 and of the value of using the resonance 
strategy to seek shorter proofs, we conducted two experiments. In the first, we gave no guidance 
(with weight emplates), simply asking OTTER to (in effect) reproduce McCune's uccess. In the 
second experiment, we modified the first experiment by including resonators (weight emplates) 
to direct OTTER's search. The templates correspond to the union of the proof steps of the four 
proofs produced with the first experiment. The researcher who wishes to duplicate these two 
experiments can use the following input file, commenting out (with %) the 18 lines of weight 
templates for the first experiment, and leaving them (without comment) for the second. 
Input  File for S tudy ing  Exponent  3 Groups  
set(knuth_bendix). 
set(process_input). 
set(index_for_back_demod). 
Following 8 are knuth-bendix options 
set(dynamic_demod_all). 
clear(para_from_right). 
set(back_demod). 
set(para_from). 
set(para_into). 
clear(para_into_right). 
sst(dynamic_demod). 
set(order_eq). 
set(lex_rpo). 
lex([e,f(x,x),g(x)]). 
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Irpo_ir_status([f(x,x)]). 
assign(pick_given_ratio, 3). 
assign(max_proofs, 4). 
assign(max_mem, 12000). 
% set(control_memory). 
set(print level). 
Z set(sos queue). 
assign(max_weight, 80). 
assign(max_seconds, 3600). 
assign(report, 300). 
assign(demod limit, 0). 
assign(reduce_weight_limit, 
clear(print_kept). 
clear(print_newdemod). 
clear(print_back_demod). 
1225). 
weight_list(pick_and_purge). 
% following is the union of proof steps for 
weight(EQ(f(e,e),e), 2). 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
welght(EQ(f 
exp3. 
(e,f (x,f (x,f (x,e)))) ,e), 2). 
(f (x,e) ,f (f (x,e) ,f (x,e))) ,e), 2). 
(f (x,e) ,f (f (x,e) ,f(x,f (f (f (e,f (x,e)) ,y) ,f (y,y))))) ,f (x,e)) , 
(f (x,y) ,e) ,f (x,f (y,f (z,f (z,f (z,e)))))) , 2). 
(f (x,y) ,f (e,z)) ,f (x,f (y,z))), 2). 
(f (x,y) ,f (f (x,y) ,f (x,f (y,e)))) ,e), 2). 
(x,e) ,x), 2). 
(x,f (f (x,f (f (x,y) ,f (e,f (f (e,z) ,f (e,z))))) ,z)) ,y), 2). 
welght (EQ (f (x,f (f (x, f (f (x,y) ,f (e,f (z,z)))) ,f (f (e,f (f (e,z) ,u)), 
f (e,f (u,u))))) ,y) , 2). 
welght (E~(f (x,f (f (x,f (f (x,y) ,z)) ,f (f (e,z) ,f (e,z)))) ,y), 2). 
welght (EQ (f 
welght (EQ (f 
welght (EQ (f 
welght (EQ (f 
welght (EQ (f 
welght (EQ (f 
welght (EQ (f 
end_of_list 
(x,f (f (y,z) ,u)) ,f (f (x,y) ,f (f (e,z) ,u))), 2). 
(x,f (x,f (f(x,f (y,f(z,e))) ,f (f (f (e,e) ,u) ,f (u,u))))) ,f (y,z)) , 
(x,f (x,f (f (y,z) ,f (z,z)))) ,f (x,f (x,f (y,e)))) , 2). 
(x,f (x,f (x,e))) ,e) , 2). 
(x,f (x,f (x,f (y,e)))) ,y), 2). 
(x,f (x,f (x,f (y,f (z,e))))) ,f (y,z)), 2). 
(x,f (y,f (e,f (f (e,f (z,z)) ,f (e,f (z,z)))))) ,f (f (x,y) ,z)), 2). 
list(usable). 
E0(x,x). 
end_of_list. 
list(sos). 
EQ(f(x,f(f(x,f(f(x,y),z)) ,f(e,f(z,z)))) ,y). 
end_of_list. 
2). 
2). 
list (passive). 
-EQ(f(e,a),a) I SANS(lid). 
-EQ(f(a,e),a) I SANS(rid). 
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-EQ( f (a , f (a ,a ) ) ,e )  I $ANS(exp3). 
-EQ( f ( f (a ,b ) ,c ) ,  f (a , f (b ,c ) ) )  f $ANS(assoc). 
end_o f_ l i s t .  
Both experiments prove (in order) the properties of right identity, exponent 3, left identity, 
and associativity. In the first experiment (without the use of the resonance strategy), the four 
proofs (in order) have length 9 and level 10, length 12 and level 13, length 30 and level 17, and 
length 31 and level 19. In the second experiment, which uses the resonance strategy, the four 
proofs (in order) have length 8 and level 8, length 10 and level 10, length 12 and level 12, and 
length 17 and level 14. We freely admit that this set of experiments was indeed satisfying, for it 
added to the growing evidence of the power of the resonance strategy. 
7. SUCCESSFULLY  SEARCHING FOR ELEGANT PROOFS 
Although the precise definition of elegance for a proof may never be available, three relevant 
properties come to mind. For each of the three, we give in this section examples of using the 
resonance strategy to obtain a proof more elegant han that which prompted the study. 
Proof length is the first of the three properties. Everything being equal, the shorter the proof, 
the more elegant. Of course, when specific inference rules are not in use, then the concept 
of the length of a proof becomes omewhat hazy; for example, symmetry of equality can be 
used implicitly without counting the corresponding proof step. Such potential haziness is not 
a problem for us in this section, for our examples each rely on the specific use of condensed 
detachment. More generally, with the exception of demodulation, o problem exists for OTTER,  
for by necessity this program uses specific inference rules. Regarding demodulation, typically its 
applications do not contribute to the reported length of a proof; for example, in proofs of single 
axioms for groups [2], some steps rely on more than 500 applications of demodulation, none 
of which are counted in the reported length, for the cited applications of demodulation merely 
produce intermediate steps not corresponding to retained clauses. 
The second property concerns the structure of a proof, specifically, concerns the nature of the 
terms present in the deduced steps. For example, one might seek a proof in which absent are terms 
of the form n(n(t)) for any term t, where the function n denotes negation. Intuition and experience 
might reasonably suggest hat such a goal may indeed be unreachable (or computationally out 
of reach) when axioms in which the function n is present are used in the proof. After all, 
one commonly sees the use of lemmas of the form not(not(x) )  -- x (in circuit design) and 
minus(minus((x)) = x (in mathematical proof). For a second example, logicians ometimes seek 
proofs that are organic, meaning that none of the steps of the proof contains a subformula that 
is true under all assignments of true and false. 
We think of the third property of elegance of a proof as one of compactness of the proof. Rather 
than a formal definition, the following illustration suffices, for one can extract from it (if desired) 
the appropriate formalism. Let the theorem T under consideration be of the form P implies Q 
and r and S. For example, let P be the Lukasiewicz axiom system consisting of L1, L2, and L3, 
and, respectively, let Q, R, and S be theses 18, 39, and 49 (the Church axiom system). If by 
hand or by program one finds a proof of T such that the proof is a proof of exactly one of Q or 
R or S, then one has a proof that is compact. Of course, to be a proof of, say, R requires that 
the last step be R and that all steps be needed in the proof. Therefore, a compact proof of T 
that completes with the deduction of R must contain as subproofs proofs of each of Q and S. 
As further evidence of the value of the resonance strategy--although sometimes assisted with 
other procedures--we give examples of proofs in which one or more of the three properties of 
elegance is present, those regarding length, structure, and compactness. The proofs are taken 
from two-valued sentential (or propositional) calculus and from many-valued sentential calculus, 
the latter being weaker than the former in the sense that the axioms of the former imply the 
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axioms of the latter. Rather than a thorough treatment of our attack, we merely supply brief 
commentary to accompany the proofs. 
7.1. Two-Va lued  Sentent ia l  Calculus 
The following three 22-step proofs of the Church axiom system were each obtained starting 
with the Lukasiewicz axiom system consisting of L1, L2, and L3. The original Lukasiewicz proof 
is (in effect) of length 33. The first of the three proofs is (from the viewpoint of our research) 
chronologically the oldest. 
P roo f  1 in Two-Va lued  Sentent ia l  Calculus 
..... > EMPTY CLAUSE at 1.21 sec .... > 122 [hyper,4,105,119,102] 
$ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_I8_35_49). 
Length  of p roo f  is 22. Leve l  of p roo f  is 16. 
PROOF 
1 [] -P(i(x,y))1 -P(x) IP(y). 
4 [] -P(i(p,i(q,p)))1 -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r))))l 
-P(i(i(n(p),n(q)),i(q,p)))i 
$ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_I8_35_49). 
I0 [] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
ii [] P(i(i(n(x),x),x)). 
12 [] P(i(x,i(n(x),y))). 
81 
83 
85 
87 
88 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
98 
101 
102 
104 
105 
108 
110 
112 
114 
115 
117 
119 
122 
[hyper, i, i0, I0] 
[hyper, I, i0, II] 
[hyper, I, i0,12] 
[hyper, i, 12, ii] 
[hyper, I, 81,81] 
[hyper, I, 81,85] 
[hyper, I, 88,83] 
[hyper, 1,91,87] 
[hyper, I, 92,93] 
[hyper, I, 81,94] 
[hyper, i, 81,95] 
P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,y)),u),i(i(z,x),u))). 
P(i(i(x,y),i(i(n(x),x),y))). 
P(i(i(i(n(x),y),z),i(x,z))). 
P(i(n(i(i(n(x),x),x)),y)). 
P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z))))). 
P(i(i(x,n(y)),i(y,i(x,z)))). 
P(i(i(x,i(n(y),y)),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
P(i(x,i(n(i(i(n(y),y),y)),z))). 
P(i(i(i(i(n(x),x),x),y),i(z,y))). 
P(i(i(x,i(n(y),y)),i(z,i(x,y)))). 
P(i(i(n(x),y),i(z,i(i(y,x),x)))). 
[hyper,l,92,98] P(i(i(i(i(x,y),y),z),i(i(n(y),x),z))). 
[hyper,l,lOI,85] P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))). 
[hyper,l,lOi,81] P(i(i(n(i(x,y)),i(z,y)),i(i(x,z),i(x,y)))). 
[hyper,l,85,102] P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
[hyper,l,lO,105] P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(y,z))). 
[hyper,l,108,102] P(i(n(x),i(x,y))). 
[hyper,l,lO,llO] P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(n(x),z))). 
[hyper,l,ll2,112] P(i(n(i(x,y)),i(n(x),z))). 
[hyper,l,92,114] P(i(i(x,y),i(n(i(x,z)),y))). 
[hyper,l,lO,li5] P(i(i(i(n(i(x,y)),z),u),i(i(x,z),u))). 
[hyper,l,ll7,104] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))). 
[hyper,4,105,119,102] $ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_I8_35_49). 
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Proo f  2 in  Two-Va lued  Sentent ia l  Ca lcu lus  
..... > EMPTY CLAUSE at 2.06 sec .... > 139 [hyper,4,110,137,106] 
SANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_i8_35_49). 
Length of proof is 22. Level of proof is 15. 
PROOF 
i [] -P(i(x,y))l -P(x) IP(y). 
4 [] -P(i(p,i(q,p)))l -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r))))l 
-P(i(i(n(p),n(q)),i(q,p)))l 
$ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_I8_85_49). 
10 [] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
Ii [] P(i(i(n(x),x),x)). 
12 [] P(i(x,i(n(x),y))). 
81 
83 
85 
87 
88 
9O 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
IO0 
105 
106 
110 
l i5  
119 
122 
i26 
i32 
i34 
137 
i39 
[hyper,l,lO,lO] 
[hyper i,i0,Ii] 
[hyper 1,10,12] 
[hyper 1,12,11] 
[hyper 1,8i,8i] 
[hyper 1,81,83] 
[hyper i,I0,87] 
[hyper,l,88,90] 
[hyper,l,85,92] 
[hyper,l,98,94] 
[hyper,l,81,95] 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,l 
[hyper,4 
P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,y)),u),i(i(z,x),u))). 
P(i(i(x,y),i(i(n(x),x),y))). 
P(i(i(i(n(x),y),z),i(x,z))). 
P(i(n(i(i(n(x),x),x)),y)). 
P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z))))). 
P(i(i(x,y),i(i(n(i(y,z)),i(y,z)),i(x,z)))). 
P(i(i(x,y),i(n(i(i(n(z),z),z)),y))). 
P(i(i(x,i(n(i(y,z)),i(y,z))),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z))))) 
P(i(x,i(n(i(i(n(y),y),y)),z))). 
P(i(i(x,i(n(y),y)),i(z,i(x,y)))). 
P(i(i(n(x),y),i(z,i(i(y,x),x)))). 
93,96] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(i(n(z) ,y) ,i(x,z)))). 
88,100] P(i(i(x,i(n(y) ,z)) ,i(i(u,i(z,y)) ,i(x,i(u,y))))). 
100,12] P(i (i(n(x) ,n(y)) ,i (y,x))). 
88,106] P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
10,110] P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(y,z))). 
118,106] P(i(n(x),i(x,y))). 
100,119] P(i(i(n(x),y),i(n(y),x))). 
122,119] P(i(n(i(x,y)),x)). 
10,126] P(i(i(x,y),i(n(i(x,z)),y))). 
105,182] P(i(i(x,i(y,i(z,u))),i(i(z,y),i(x,i(z,u))))). 
134,10] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))). 
110,137,106] $ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_18_35_49). 
Proof  3 in Two-Va lued  Sentent ia l  Ca lcu lus  
..... > EMPTY CLAUSE at 1.18 sec .... > 125 [hyper,4,110,128,108] 
$ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FL_I8_35_49). 
Length of proof is 22. Level of proof is 17. 
PROOF 
I [] -P(i(x,y))l -P(x) lP(y). 
4 [] -P(i(p,i(q,p)))l -P(i(i(p,i(q,r)),i(i(p,q),i(p,r))))l 
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-P(i(i(n(p),n(q)),i(q,p)))1 
$ANSWER(step_alIBEHChurch_FL_18_35_49). 
I0 [] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
Ii [] P(i(i(n(x),x),x)). 
12 [] P(i(x,i(n(x),y))). 
81 
84 
86 
87 
89 
91 
93 
94 
96 
99 
101 
103 
105 
107 
108 
110 
113 
115 
117 
119 
121 
123 
125 
[hyper,l,lO 
[hyper,l,lO 
[hyper,l,12 
[hyper,l,81 
[hyper,l,81 
[hyper,1,87 
[hyper,l,89 
[hyper,1,93 
[hyper,l,84 
[hyper,l,91 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
10] P(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,i(z,y)) ,u) ,i(i(z,x) ,u))). 
12] P(i(i(i(n(x) ,y) ,z) ,i(x,z))) . 
11] P(i(n(i(i(n(x) ,x) ,x)) ,y)). 
81] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)), i(i(u,y) ,i(x,i(u,z))))). 
10] P(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(i(x,z) ,u) ,i(i(y,z) ,u)))) . 
89] P(i(i(x,i(i(y,z) ,u)) ,i(i(y,v) ,i(x,i(i(v,z) ,u))))) . 
86] P(i(i(i(n(i(i(n(x) ,x) ,x)) ,y) ,z) ,i(i(u,y) ,z))) . 
11] P(i(i(x,i(i(n(y) ,y) ,y)) ,i(i(n(y) ,y) ,y))). 
94] P(i(x,i(i(n(y) ,y) ,y))). 
96] P(i(i(n(x) ,y) ,i(z,i(i(y,x) ,x)))). 
1,10 
1,101,11] 
1,87,103] 
1,91,105] 
1,105,12] 
1,84,108] 
1,10,110] 
1,113,108] 
1,105,115] 
1,117,115] 
1,107,119] 
1,121,10] 
4,110,123,108] 
99] P(i(i(i(x,i(i(y,z),z)),u),i(i(n(z),y),u))). 
P(i(i(n(x),y),i(i(y,x),x))). 
P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(n(z),y),i(x,z)))). 
P(i(i(n(x),y),i(i(z,i(u,x)),i(i(y,u),i(z,x))))). 
P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))). 
P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(y,z))). 
P(i(n(x),i(x,y))). 
P(i(i(n(x),y),i(n(y),x))). 
P(i(n(i(x,y)),x)). 
P(i(i(x,i(y,i(z,u))),i(i(z,y),i(x,i(z,u))))). 
P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(x,y),i(x,z)))). 
$ANSWER(step_alIBEH_Church_FLI8_35_49). 
An examination of the three proofs yields (to us) some surprising differences. The first proof 
contains eight steps not present in the second, and it contains twelve steps not present in the 
third. The second proof contains eight steps not present in the third. Where the first and third 
proofs are free of any formula in which five or more distinct variables occur, the second proof 
contains one step in which five distinct variables occur. As for similarities, no step in any of 
the three proofs contains a formula of the form n(n(t)) for any term t, nor is there present a 
subterm of the form i(x, x). Each proof completes with the deduction of thesis 35; therefore, each 
is compact. We know of no shorter proof than one of length 22, and we offer the corresponding 
question for research. 
7.2. Many-Va lued  Sentent ia l  Ca lcu lus  
As further evidence of the value of using the resonance strategy to search for elegant proofs, we 
turn to many-valued sentential calculus, which can be axiomatized with the following four formu- 
las [5,16] (written in clause notation) in which the function i can be interpreted as "implication" 
and the function n as "negation." 
P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
P(i(i(i(x,y),y),i(i(y,x),x))). 
P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))). 
CAH~ 29:2-L 
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As is typical of many logic calculi, again the inference rule that is used is condensed detachment, 
captured by the earlier cited clause (in Sections 1.1 and 1.5, for example) for that purpose 
coupled with the use of hyperresolution. Many-valued sentential calculus is weaker than two- 
valued sentential calculus in that the axioms of the former are deducible from the axioms of 
the latter. The theorem under study asserts that the following formula (in clause notation) is 
deducible from the given four axioms; we call the formula MV5. 
V(i(i(i(x,y) ,i(y,x)),i(y,x))). 
When Meredith proved that MV5 is dependent on the given four axioms for many-valued sen- 
tential calculus [16], it marked  an important advance for that field. 
F rom the historical perspective, the goal of proving the given theorem in a single run without 
substantial guidance eluded our numerous  attempts with OTTER under diverse option settings 
for more  than two and one-half years. As  reported in [17], we  had with an iterated approach and 
with many suggestions obtained a 63-step proof. Even  with that proof in hand, we  could go no 
further f rom February 1990 until September  1992, unless we resorted to a proof-checking mode.  
(For those researchers interested in a successful attack in proving the theorem under discussion 
without substantial guidance, see Section 5.2 of [10].) 
We now give the input file that does this proof checking--in a manner that attempts to exclude 
from retention almost all other clauses--and follow it with the 63-step proof. We note that 
list(passive) is used only for unit conflict and for forward subsumption. (The input file and 
proof differ only slightly from that respectively used and obtained in February 1990; the main 
difference rests with the use of order_history, resulting in the ancestors being listed as nucleus, 
major premiss, and minor premiss.) 
Input  File for Proof  Checking a 63-Step Proof  
set (hyper_res). 
assign (fpa_literals, 8). 
assign(max_weight, 2). 
assign(max_proofs, O) . 
clear (print_kept). 
Y. clear(back_sub). 
assign(max_seconds ,7200). 
assign (max_mem, 24000) . 
assign(report, 300) . 
set (order_history). 
set (sos_queue). 
wemght_list (purge_gen). 
welght (P(i(x,i(y,i (z,y)))) ,2). 
wemght(P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,y)) ,u) ,i(i(z,x) ,u))),2). 
wemght (P(i(x, i(i (y,z), i(i(z,u) ,i(y,u))))) ,2). 
wemght (P(i (i(i(x,y) ,z), i(y,z))) ,2). 
wemght (P(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,y) ,z), i(i(i(y,x) ,x) ,z))) ,2). 
welght 
wemght 
wexght 
wsmght 
weight 
welght 
weight 
welght 
(P (i (i (i (x, y), z), i (i (n (y), n(x) ), z) ) ), 2). 
(P(i(i(i(x,i(y,x)),z) ,z)),2). 
(P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z))))),2). 
(P(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(i(x,z) ,u) ,i(i (y,z) ,u)))) ,2). 
(P(i (i(i(i (x,y) ,i (i(y,z) ,i(x,z))) ,u) ,u)) ,2). 
(P(i(n(x),i(x,y))),2). 
(P(i(x,i(i(x,y) ,y))) ,2). 
(P(i(i(i(x,i(y,x)),i(y,x)) ,i(i(i(x,y) ,y),x))) ,2). 
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wemght (P(i (i(n(x) ,n(i(y,i(z,y)))) ,x)) ,2). 
welght (P(i(i(n(x),n(i(i(y,z),i(i(z,u),i(y,u))))),x)),2)- 
welght (P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(x,i(i(z,u) ,i(y,u))))) ,2). 
welght (P (i(i(x,y) ,i(n(y) ,i(x,z)))) ,2) . 
weight (P(i(i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(n(x) ,z))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(y,i(x,z)))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i (i(x,y) ,i(i(i(y,x) ,x) ,y))) ,2) . 
wemght (P (i(i(i(i(n(x) ,n(i(y,i(z,y)))) ,x) ,u) ,u)) ,2). 
welght (P(i(x,i(i(y,z) ,i(i(x,y) ,z)))) ,2). 
welght (P(i(i(i(n(x),i(y,z)) ,u) ,i(i(y,x) ,u))) ,2). 
welght (P (i(n(n(x)) ,x)) ,2) . 
wemght (P(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(z,x) ,i(z,y)))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x, i (n(y) ,n(i(z,i(u,z))))) ,i(x,y))) ,2). 
welght (P(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(z,x) ,y)) ,u) ,i(z,u))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(i(n(n(x)) ,y) ,z) ,i(i(x,y) ,z))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(x,n(n(x)))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,n(n(y))),i(x,y))) ,2) . 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(i(y,z) ,u)),i(x,i(z,u)))) ,2). 
weight (P (i (i (x, i (n (y), n (z)) ), i (x, i (z, y) ) ) ), 2). 
weight (P(i(i(n(x),y) ,i(n(y) ,x))) ,2) . 
weight (P(i(i(n(n(x)) ,y) ,i(x,y))) ,2) . 
weight (P(i (i (i (x,y) ,n(z)), i (z,x)) ), 2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,y),i(n(y),n(x)))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,i(n(n(y)) ,z)) ,i(x,i(y,z)))) ,2) . 
weight (P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(x,i(n(z) ,n(y))))) ,2). 
welght (P(i(n(i(x,y)) ,n(y))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(i(n(x) ,n(y)) ,z) ,i(i(y,x) ,z))) ,2). 
welght (P(i(n(i(x,y)) ,n(i(i(y,z) ,n(x))))),2). 
welght (P (i(i(i(x,y) ,i(z,u)) ,i(y,i(n(u) ,n(z))))) ,2). 
welght (P(i (i(i(n(x) ,n(i(y,x))) ,n(i(y,x))) ,n(x))) ,2). 
welght (P (i(i(x, i (i (n(y) ,n(z)) ,u)) ,i(x,i(i(z,y) ,u)))) ,2). 
welght(P(i(i(i(n(x) ,n(y)) ,n(y)) ,i(i(x,y) ,n(x)))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,n(i(y,z))) ,i(x,n(i(i(z,u) ,n(y)))))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,i(i(n(y) ,n(i(z,y))) ,n(i(z,y)))) ,i(x,n(y)))) ,2) . 
welght(P(i(n(x) ,i(n(n(y)) ,n(i(y,x))))),2) . 
welght (P(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,y) ,n(i(x,y))) ,n(y))) ,2) . 
welght (P (i(n(x) ,i(y,n(i(y,x))))) ,2). 
welght (P(i(i(x,i(i(i(y,z) ,z) ,n(i(y,z)))) ,i(x,n(z)))) ,2) . 
welght (P (i(i(i(n(x) ,i(y,n(i(y,x)))) ,z) ,z)) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,y) ,n(i(y,x))) ,n(x))) ,2) . 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(i(i(y,z) ,z) ,n(i(z,y)))) ,i(x,n(y)))) ,2). 
welght (P (i(i(x,y) ,i(i(y,n(i(y,x))) ,n(x)))) ,2). 
welght (P(i (i(i(x,n(i(x,y))) ,n(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))) ,n(y)))) ,n(n(y)))),2). 
welght(P(i(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))) ,n(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))) ,n(y)))) ,y)) ,2) . 
welght(P(i(i(x,i(i(y,n(i(y,z))) ,n(i(i(y,n(i(y,z))) ,n(z))))) ,i(x,z))) ,2). 
welght(P(i(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))),n(i(y,x))),y)),2) . 
welght (P(i(i(x,i(i(y,n(i(y,z))) ,n(i(z,y)))) ,i(x,z))) ,2). 
weight (P(i(x,i(i(n(i(x,y)) ,n(i(y,x))),y))),2) . 
welght (P(i(x,i(i(i(y,x) ,i(x,y)) ,y))) ,2) . 
welght (P(i(i(i(x,y) ,i(y,x)) ,i(y,x))) ,2). 
end_of_list. 
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list(axioms). 
-P(i(x,y)) I -P(x) 
end_of_list. 
I P(y). 
list(sos). 
P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
P(i(i(i(x,y),y),i(i(y,x),x))). 
P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))). 
end_of_list. 
list(passive). 
-P(i(a,i(b,i(c,b)))) I $ANS(step_Oi). 
-P(i(i(i(i(a,b),i(c,b)),d),i(i(c,a),d))) I SANS(step_02). 
-P(i(a,i(i(b,c),i(i(c,d),i(b,d))))) I SANS(step_03). 
-P(i(i(i(a,b),c),i(b,c))) i SANS(step_04). 
-P(i(i(i(i(a,b),b),c),i(i(i(b,a),a),c))) I SANS(step_05). 
-P(i(i(i(a,b),c),i(i(n(b),n(a)),c))) I SANS(step_06). 
-P(i(i(i(a,i(b,a)),c),c)) i $ANS(step_O7). 
-P(i(i(a,i(b,c)),i(i(d,b),i(a,i(d,c))))) i SANS(step_08). 
-P(i(i(a,b),i(i(i(a,c),d),i(i(b,c),d)))) I SANS(step_09). 
-P(i(i(i(i(a,b),i(i(b,c),i(a,c))),d),d)) I $ANS(step_iO). 
-P(i(n(a),i(a,b))) I $ANS(step_ll). 
-P(i(a,i(i(a,b),b))) i SANS(step_f2). 
-P(i(i(i(a,i(b,a)),i(b,a)),i(i(i(a,b),b),a))) I SANS(step_f3). 
-P(i(i(n(a),n(i(b,i(c,b)))),a)) I SANS(step_f4). 
-P(i(i(n(a),n(i(i(b,c),i(i(c,d),i(b,d))))),a)) I SANS(step_f5). 
-P(i(i(a,i(b,c)),i(a,i(i(c,d),i(b,d))))) i SANS(step_J6). 
-P(i(i(a,b),i(n(b),i(a,c)))) I $ANS(step_17). 
-P(i(i(i(a,b),c),i(n(a),c))) I SANS(step_f8). 
-P(i(i(a,i(b,c)),i(b,i(a,c)))) I SANS(step_t9). 
-P(i(i(a,b),i(i(i(b,a),a),b))) I SANS(step_20). 
-P(i(i(i(i(n(a),n(i(b,i(c,b)))),a),d),d)) I SANS(step_21). 
-P(i(a,i(i(b,c),i(i(a,b),c)))) I SANS(step_22). 
-P(i(i(i(n(a),i(b,c)),d),i(i(b,a),d))) i SANS(step_23). 
-P(i(n(n(a)),a)) i $ANS(lemma_24). 
-P(i(i(a,b),i(i(c,a),i(c,b)))) I $ANS(lemma_25). 
-P(i(i(a,i(n(b),n(i(c,i(d,c))))),i(a,b))) I SANS(step_26). 
-P(i(i(i(i(a,b),i(i(c,a),b)),d),i(c,d))) i SANS(step_27). 
-P(i(i(i(n(n(a)),b),c),i(i(a,b),c))) i SANS(step_28). 
-P(i(a,n(n(a)))) I $ANS(lemma_29). 
-P(i(i(a,n(n(b))),i(a,b))) I SANS(step_30). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(b,c),d)),i(a,i(c,d)))) I SANS(step_31). 
-P(i(i(a,i(n(b),n(c))),i(a,i(c,b)))) i SANS(step_32). 
-P(i(i(n(a),b),i(n(b),a))) I SANS(step_33). 
-P(i(i(n(n(a)'),b),i(a,b))) I SANS(step_34). 
-P(i(i(i(a,b),n(c)),i(c,a))) I SANS(step_35). 
-P(i(i(a,b),i(n(b),n(a)))) i $ANS(lemma_36). 
-P(i(i(a,i(n(n(b)),c)),i(a,i(b,c)))) I SANS(step_37). 
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-P(i(i(a,i(b,c)),i(a,i(n(c),n(b))))) I SANS(step_38). 
-P(i(n(i(a,b)),n(b))) I SANS(step_39). 
-P(i(i(i(n(a),n(b)),c),i(i(b,a),c))) I SANS(step_40). 
-P(i(n(i(a,b)),n(i(i(b,c),n(a))))) i SANS(step_41). 
-P(i(i(i(a,b),i(c,d)),i(b,i(n(d),n(c))))) i SANS(step_42). 
-P(i(i(i(n(a),n(i(b,a))),n(i(b,a))),n(a))) 1 SANS(step_43). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(n(b),n(c)),d)),i(a,i(i(c,b),d)))) I SANS(step_44). 
-P(i(i(i(n(a),n(b)),n(b)),i(i(a,b),n(a)))) i SANS(step 45). 
-P(i(i(a,n(i(b,c))),i(a,n(i(i(c,d),n(b)))))) i SANS(step_46). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(n(b),n(i(c,b))),n(i(c,b)))),i(a,n(b)))) i SANS(step_47). 
-P(i(n(a),i(n(n(b)),n(i(b,a))))) I SANS(step_48). 
-P(i(i(i(i(a,b),b),n(i(a,b))),n(b))) ] SANS(step_49). 
-P(i(n(a),i(b,n(i(b,a))))) ] SANS(step_50). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(i(b,c),c),n(i(b,c)))),i(a,n(c)))) I SANS(step_51). 
-P(i(i(i(n(a),i(b,n(i(b,a)))),c),c)) ] SANS(step_52). 
-P(i(i(i(i(a,b),b),n(i(b,a))),n(a))) I SANS(step_53). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(i(b,c),c),n(i(c,b)))),i(a,n(b)))) 1 SANS(step_54). 
-P(i(i(a,b),i(i(b,n(i(b,a))),n(a)))) i SANS(step_55). 
-P(i(i(i(a,n(i(a,b))),n(i(i(a,n(i(a,b))),n(b)))),n(n(b)))) I SANS(step_56). 
-P(i(i(i(a,n(i(a,b))),n(i(i(a,n(i(a,b))),n(b)))),b)) I SANS(step 57). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(b,n(i(b,c))),n(i(i(b,n(i(b,c))),n(c))))),i(a,c))) I 
SANS(step_58). 
-P(i(i(i(a,n(i(a,b))),n(i(b,a))),b)) i SANS(step_59). 
-P(i(i(a,i(i(b,n(i(b,c))),n(i(c,b)))),i(a,c))) ] SANS(step_60). 
-P(i(a,i(i(n(i(a,b)),n(i(b,a))),b))) i SANS(step_61). 
-P(i(a,i(i(i(b,a),i(a,b)),b))) I SANS(step_62). 
-P(i(i(i(a,b),i(b,a)),i(b,a))) I SANS(step_63). 
end_of_list. 
Proof  o f  MV5 
i [] -P(i(x,y)) I -P(x) I P(y). 
2 [] P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
3 [] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
4 [] P(i(i(i(x,y),y),i(i(y,x),x))). 
5 [] P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))). 
68 [] -P(i(i(i(a,b),i(b,a)),i(b,a))) 
in 63 Steps  
I SANS(step_63). 
69 
71 
73 
75 
77 
79 
81 
83 
85 
87 
89 
91 
94 
98 
[hyper, I, 2,2] 
[hyper, i, 3,3] 
[hyper, i, 2,3] 
[hyper, I, 3,2] 
[hyper, i, 3,4] 
[hyper, i, 3,5] 
P(i(x,i(y,i(z,y)))). 
P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,y)),u),i(i(z,x),u))). 
P(i(x,i(i(y,z),i(i(z,u),i(y,u))))). 
P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(y,z))). 
P(i(i(i(i(x,y),y),z),i(i(i(y,x),x),z))). 
P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(i(n(y),n(x)),z))). 
[hyper,l,4,69] P(i(i(i(x,i(y,x)),z),z)). 
[hyper,l,71,71] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(i(u,y),i(x,i(u,z))))). 
[hyper,l,71,3] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(i(x,z),u),i(i(y,z),u)))). 
[hyper,l,4,73] P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z))),u),u)). 
[hyper,l,75,5] P(i(n(x),i(x,y))). 
[hyper,l,75,4] P(i(x,i(i(x,y),y))). 
[hyper,l,77,77] P(i(i(i(x,i(y,x)),i(y,x)),i(i(i(x,y),y),x))). 
[hyper,l,79,81] P(i(i(n(x),n(i(y,i(z,y)))),x)). 
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100 
102 
104 
106 
108 
110 
112 
114 
116 
119 
121 
123 
125 
127 
129 
137 
140 
142 
144 
147 
154 
156 
161 
165 
167 
169 
171 
175 
177 
179 
181 
183 
186 
188 
191 
193 
195 
197 
2OO 
2O2 
2O4 
207 
[hyper,1,79.87] P(i(i(n(x),n(i(i(y,z),i(i(z,u),i(y,u))))),x)). 
[hyper,i,71,87] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(x,i(i(z,u),i(y,u))))). 
[hyper,l,83,89] P(i(i(x,y),i(n(y),i(x,z)))). 
[hyper,l,3,88] P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(n(x),z))). 
[hyper,1,83,91] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(y,i(x,z)))). 
[hyper,l,75,84] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(i(y,x),x),y))). 
[hyper,1,91,88] P(i(i(i(i(n(x),n(i(y,i(z,y)))),x),u),u)). 
[hyper,1,102,91] P(i(x,i(i(y,z),i(i(x,y),z)))). 
[hyper,l,3,104] P(i(i(i(n(x),i(y,z)),u),i(i(y,x),u))). 
[hyper,l,106,100] P(i(n(n(x)),x)). 
[hyper,1,87,108] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(z,x),i(z,y)))). 
[hyper,l,71,112] P(i(i(x,i(n(y),n(i(z,i(u,z))))),i(x,y))). 
[hyper,l,3,114] P(i(i(i(i(x,y),i(i(z,x),y)),u),i(z,u))). 
[hyper,l,85,119] P(i(i(i(n(n(x)),y),z),i(i(x,y),z))). 
[hyper,l,5,119] P(i(x,n(n(x)))). 
[hyper,l,121,119] P(i(i(x,n(n(y))),i(x,y))). 
[hyper,1,121,75] P(i(i(x,i(i(y,z),u)),i(x,i(z,u)))). 
[hyper,1,121,5] P(i(i(x,i(n(y),n(z))),i(x,i(z,y)))). 
[hyper,l,l16,123] P(i(i(n(x),y),i(n(y),x))). 
[hyper,l,3,129] P(i(i(n(n(x)),y),i(x,y))). 
[hyper,1,142,106] P(i(i(i(x,y),n(z)),i(z,x))). 
[hyper,l,127,144] P(i(i(x,y),i(n(y),n(x)))). 
[hyper 1,121,147] P(i(i(x,i(n(n(y)),z)),i(x,i(y,z)))). 
[hyper 1,121,156] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)),i(x,i(n(z),n(y))))). 
[hyper 1,81,156] P(i(n(i(x,y)),n(y))). 
[hyper 1,3,156] P(i(i(i(n(x),n(y)),z),i(i(y,x),z))). 
[hyper 1,156,154] P(i(n(i(x,y)),n(i(i(y,z),n(x))))). 
[hyper 1,140,165] P(i(i(i(x,y),i(z,u)),i(y,i(n(u),n(z))))). 
[hyper 1,110,167] P(i(i(i(n(x),n(i(y,x))),n(i(y,x))),n(x))). 
[hyper,l,121,169] P(i(i(x,i(i(n(y),n(z)),u)),i(x,i(i(z,y),u)))). 
[hyper,l,77,169] P(i(i(i(n(x),n(y)),n(y)),i(i(x,y),n(x)))). 
[hyper,l,121,171] P(i(i(x,n(i(y,z))),i(x,n(i(i(z,u),n(y)))))). 
[hyper,l,121,177] P(i(i(x,i(i(n(y),n(i(z,y))),n(i(z,y)))),i(x,n(y)))) 
[hyper,l,175,181] P(i(n(x),i(n(n(y)),n(i(y,x))))). 
[hyper,l,186,79] P(i(i(i(i(x,y),y),n(i(x,y))),n(y))). 
[hyper,1,161,188] P(i(n(x),i(y,n(i(y,x))))). 
[hyper,l,121,191] P(i(i(x,i(i(i(y,z),z),n(i(y,z)))),i(x,n(z)))). 
[hyper,1,91,193] P(i(i(i(n(x),i(y,n(i(y,x)))),z),z)). 
[hyper,l,195,77] P(i(i(i(i(x,y),y),n(i(y,x))),n(x))). 
[hyper,1,121,200] P(i(i(x,i(i(i(y,z),z),n(i(z,y)))),i(x,n(y)))). 
[hyper,l,125,202] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,n(i(y,x))),n(x)))). 
[hyper,1,197,204] P(i(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))),n(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))),n(y)))), 
n(n(y)))). 
210 [hyper,l,137,207] 
212 [hyper,l,121,210] 
n(z))))),i(x,z))). 
214 [hyper,l,212,183] 
216 [hyper,l,121,214] 
218 [hyper,l,125,216] 
220 [hyper,l,178,218] 
222 [hyper,l,108,220] 
P(i (i (i(x ,n(i (x ,y) ) ) ,n(i (i (x, n (i (x ,y) ) ) ,n(y) ) ) ) .y) ) 
P(i(i(x,i(i(y,n(i(y,z))),n(i(i(y,n(i(y,z))), 
P(i(i(i(x,n(i(x,y))),n(i(y,x))),y)). 
P(i(i(x,i(i(y,n(i(y,z))),n(i(z,y)))),i(x,z))). 
P(i(x,i(i(n(i(x,y)),n(i(y,x))),y))). 
P(i(x,i(i(i(y,x),i(x,y)),y))). 
P(i(i(i(x,y),i(y,x)),i(y,x))). 
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Clause (222) contradicts clause (68), and the proof of MV5 is complete, with length 63 and 
level 23. 
Because of our interest in using OTTER to seek elegant proofs--in this context, focusing on 
proof structure--we investigated the possibility of finding a proof of the theorem under discussion 
in which absent are all terms of the form n(n(t)) for any term t. From a respected colleague, we 
received the conjecture that such a proof did not exist. After all, experiments with many-valued 
sentential calculus and related calculi exhibited abundant use of the terms that we intended 
to avoid. At the same time, we planned to seek proofs shorter than 63 steps (of condensed 
detachment). After numerous experiments, we did in fact find (with OTTER) a 39-step proof 
free of any terms of the form n(n(t)). When we much later revisited the theorem in question, but 
added the use of the resonance strategy and dropped the term structure requirement, OTTER 
found a 35-step proof [10]. We close the history of this problem by noting that the knowledge of 
the 39-step proof with the term structure constraint and the 35-step proof without it caused us 
to study again (during the writing of this article) the theorem with the resonance strategy. 
Our goal was to seek a proof that the four given axioms for many-valued sentential calculus 
imply the formula we call MV5 such that strictly less than 35 applications of condensed etach- 
ment are required and such that no term of the form n(n(t)) is present in any of the proof steps. 
In our first experiment, for resonators, we used correspondents of the four axioms (each with a 
weight of 1) that serve as the hypotheses of the theorem to be proved, followed by correspondents 
(32 of them each with a weight of 2) of the proof steps of the 35-step proof with the exception 
of those (the three) that contain a term of the form n(n(t)), followed by correspondents (15 of 
them each with a weight of 4) of the proof steps of the 39-step proof that are not present in 
the 35-step proof. All resonators were placed in weight_list(pick_and_purge). At the start of the 
run, the max_weight was set to 22; it was then reduced to 16 after 1000 clauses were chosen as 
the focus of attention. A limit of 4 was placed on the number of distinct variables in a retained 
conclusion. The ratio strategy was used with the assigned parameter of 3. Ancestor subsumption 
was used, and so also was back subsumption. OTTER was instructed to drive its reasoning by 
first focusing on each of the four axioms, placed in list(sos), before choosing from the pool of 
deduced-and-retained clauses. Finally, the input for the first experiment included the following 
demodulator list, whose function we explain immediately. 
l i s t (demodulators ) .  
(n(n(x)) = junk). 
( i ( i (x ,x) ,y)  = junk) .  
( i (y , i (x ,x))  = junk). 
( i ( junk,x) = junk). 
( i (x, junk) = junk). 
(n(junk) = junk). 
(P(junk) = ST). 
end_of_ l i s t .  
The first demodulator is included to begin the process of purging deduced clauses containing 
as a subterm a term of the form n(n(t)). The second and third demodulators are included to 
begin the process of purging deduced clauses that contain as a proper subterm a term of the form 
i(t,t) for any term t. The remaining demodulators enable the program, with one exception, to 
complete the process of purging unwanted clauses of the types under discussion, for such clauses 
are eventually demodulated to ST, which the program treats as "true" and, therefore, purges. 
Regarding the exception, the given set of demodulators does not address the purging of a clause 
properly containing a term of the form n(i(t,t)) for some term t. One could certainly add two 
such demodulators, the following; we simply failed to do so. 
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(i(n(i(x,x)),y) = junk). 
(i(y,n(i(x,x))) = junk). 
In approximately 13 CPU-seconds on a SPARCstation 2, OTTER produced a 41-step proof of 
level 18 upon retention of a clause numbered 1823, and in approximately 353 CPU-seconds (in 
the same run) produced a 38-step proof of level 15 upon retention of a clause numbered 16228. 
The experiment had succeeded in one of its goals, that of producing a shorter proof (than previ- 
ously known) of the theorem under study such that absent are the n(n(t)) terms. This success 
immediately led to the second experiment, that in which the second and third demodulators were 
commented out (by placing % in column I). In other words, we permitted OTTER to retain 
clauses whether or not they contained as a proper subterm a term of the form i(t, t). 
In approximately 33 CPU-seconds on a SPARCstation 2, OTTER produced a 41-step proof of 
level 18 upon retention of a clause numbered 3264, and in approximately 409 CPU-seconds (in 
the same run) produced a 34-step proof of level 17 upon retention of a clause numbered 18192. 
A glance at the resulting 34-step proof (which we immediately give) produces a mystery (whose 
possible answer we give at the end of this subsection), for none of its steps takes advantage of the 
added latitude permitted in the second experiment. In fact, the 34-step proof contains but one 
clause that is not present in the 38-step proof found in the cited first experiment. In particular, 
none of the clauses contains as a proper subterm a term of the form i(t, t). 
A Mice 34-Step Proof with the Structure-Avoidance Property 
i [] -P(i(x,y))l -P(x) IP(y). 
2 [] P(i(x,i(y,x))). 
3 [] P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))). 
4 [] p(i(i(i(x,y),y),i(i(y,x),x))). 
5 [] P(i(i(n(x),n(y)),i(y,x))). 
6 [] -P(i(i(i(a,b),i(b,a)),i(b,a)))l$ANS(step_MV5). 
17 
19 
2O 
22 
27 
32 
33 
38 
51 
56 
71 
72 
75 
83 
208 
220 
227 
254 
358 
360 
361 
495 
537 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
[hyper 
1,3,3] P(i(i (i(i(x,y) ,i(z,y)) ,u) ,i (i(z,x) ,u))). 
i,3,2] P (i (i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(y,z))). 
i,3,4] P(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,y) ,z) ,i(i(i(y,x) ,x) ,z))). 
i,3,5] P (i (i(i (x,y) ,z) ,i (i(n(y) ,n(x)) ,z))). 
i,i7,i7] P(i (i(x, i(y,z)), i(i(u,y) ,i (x,i(u,z))))). 
I,i9,5] P(i(n(x) ,i(x,y))). 
i,19,4] P(i(x,i(i(x,y) ,y))). 
i,3,20] P(i(i(i(i(i(x,y) ,y) ,z) ,u) ,i(i(i(i(y,x) ,x) ,z) ,u))). 
i,3,22] P(i(i (i (i(n(x) ,n(y)) ,z) ,u) ,i(i(i(y,x) ,z) ,u))). 
i,22,4] P(i(i(n(x) ,n(i(y,x))) ,i(i(x,y) ,y))). 
i,27,32] P(i (i(x,y) ,i(n(y), i (x,z)))). 
1,3,32] P(i(i(i (x,y) ,z) ,i (n(x) ,z))). 
i,27,33] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(y,i(x,z)))). 
i,33,32] P(i(i(i(n(x) ,i(x,y)) ,z) ,z)). 
[hyper, 1,22,Z5] P(i(i(n(i(x,y)) ,n(z)) ,i(x,i(z,y)))). 
[hyper, I ,Y5,3] P(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(z,x) ,i(z,y)))). 
[hyper, I, 2Z, 220] P(i(i(x,i(y,z)) ,i(i(z,u) ,i(x,i(y,u))))). 
[hyper, 1,22,83] P(i(i (n(x) ,n(i (n(y), i(y,z)) )) ,x)). 
[hyper, i ,227,75] P(i(i(i(x,y) ,z) ,i(i(x,i(u,y)) ,i(u,z)))). 
[hyper,l,22Y,71] P(i(i(i(x,y),z),i(i(x,u),i(n(u),z)))). 
[hyper, 1,227,56] P(i(i(x,y) ,i(i(n(z) ,n(i(x,z))) ,i(i(z,x) ,y)))). 
[hyper,l,360,254] P(i(i(n(x),y),i(n(y),x))). 
[hyper, I, 220,495] P(i(i(x,i(n(y) ,z)) ,i(x,i(n(z) ,y)))) . 
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636 [hyper , l ,537 ,72]  P ( i ( i ( i (x ,y ) , z ) , i (n (z ) ,x ) ) ) .  
648 [hyper , l ,220,636]  P ( i ( i (x , i ( i (y , z ) ,u ) ) , i (x , i (n (u ) ,y ) ) ) ) .  
687 [hyper , l ,636 ,5]  P ( i (n ( i (x ,y ) ) ,n (y ) ) ) .  
713 [hyper , l ,33 ,687]  P ( i ( i ( i (n ( i (x ,y ) ) ,n (y ) ) , z ) , z ) ) .  
728 [hyper , l ,20 ,713]  P ( i ( i ( i (n (x ) ,n ( i (y ,x ) ) ) ,n ( i (y ,x ) ) ) ,n (x ) ) ) .  
732 [hyper , l ,51 ,728]  P ( i ( i ( i ( i (x ,y ) ,y ) ,n ( i (x ,y ) ) ) ,n (y ) ) ) .  
759 [hyper , l ,38 ,732]  P ( i ( i ( i ( i (x ,y ) ,y ) ,n ( i (y ,x ) ) ) ,n (x ) ) ) .  
17438 [hyper , l ,358,759]  P ( i ( i ( i ( i (x ,y ) ,y ) , i ( z ,n ( i (y ,x ) ) ) ) , i ( z ,n (x ) ) ) ) .  
17709 [hyper , l ,648,361]  P ( i ( i (x ,y ) , i (n ( i ( i ( z ,x ) ,y ) ) ,n (z ) ) ) ) .  
17811 [hyper, 1,17438,17709] P ( i  (n( i  ( i  ( i  (x, y),  i (y,x)) ,x) ) ,n(y) )) .  
18192 [hyper,1,208,17811] 9 ( / ( l ( i (x ,y ) , i (y ,x ) ) , / (y ,x ) ) ) .  
Clause (18192) contradicts clause (6), and the proof of MV5 is complete, with length 34 and 
level 17. 
The 34-step proof shares in common with the 35-step proof 29 steps. Three of the steps of the 
34-step proof fail to match as a resonator any of the resonators corresponding to the steps of the 
35-step proof. The 34-step proof shares in common with the 39-step proof 31 steps. Eight of the 
steps of the 34-step proof fail to match as a resonator any of those that correspond to the steps of 
the 39-step proof. Three steps of the 34-step proof are not among the steps of either the 35-step 
proof or the 39-step proof. Two of the steps of the 34-step proof fail to match as a resonator any 
resonator corresponding to a step in the 35-step proof or in the 39-step proof. 
Regarding a possible answer to the mystery of why OTTER produced a 34-step proof in 
contrast o the 38-step proof it first found, we first comment on why it is in fact a mystery. 
First, to complete the 34-step proof, OTTER clearly does not follow the same paths it followed 
to produce the 38-step proof; otherwise, the program would in fact have found (in the first 
cited experiment) the given 34-step proof. Since only one change was made between the first 
and second experiments, the change accounts for following different paths. Second, because the 
change in the input gives OTTER more latitude;, namely, tile use of clauses properly containing 
terms of the form i(t, t), one naturally conjectures that such clauses must play a key role. Third, 
one might therefore asily conjecture--we certainly did--that such clauses would appear in the 
34-step proof, explaining the shortening by four steps of the desired proof in terms of the added 
latitude. 
But, such clauses do not appear in the 34-step proof; indeed, the only clause in the 34-step 
proof that is not in the 38-step proof is the following. 
P ( i  (n ( i  (x ,y ) )  ,n (y ) ) ) .  
Clearly absent from the given clause are i(t, t) terms. Except for n(i(t, t)) terms, the 38-step roof 
must satisfy the avoidance of i(t, t) terms, for it is obtained with the first experiment, and that 
experiment, prohibits their use. Inspection of the 38-step proof shows that such unwanted terms 
are absent~ a fact that was also verified with an OTTER run that included two appropriately 
chosen demodulators. 
The explanation of how OTTER was able to complete a 34-step proof--four steps shorter than 
the 38-step proof found in the first experiment--apparently rests with the data structures and 
the indexing of terms. Indeed, although they are not used in the desired proof, the retention of 
clauses properly containing i(t, t) terms changes the contents of the data structure and affects 
the indexing of terms, which in turn causes the program to traverse different paths (through the 
search space of conclusions) than it otherwise would. 
7.3. The  Re levance of  E legance to App l leat lons  
Two applications are the focus of this subsection, logic circuit design and algorithm synthesis. 
Here we briefly discuss the relevance to these two applications of finding proofs with one or more 
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of the three properties of elegance that have been under discussion. In doing so, we show how 
the resonance strategy is useful in solving what might be termed practical problems. We begin 
with proof length. 
When the problem is one either of circuit design or algorithm synthesis, one can profitably use 
the ANSWER literal offered by OTTER. In particular, depending on the nature of the proof, 
if one is found and the argument of the ANSWER literal is suitably prepared, the ANSWER 
literal will contain as its argument he corresponding circuit that is designed or algorithm that 
is synthesized. In [3, Chapter 7], we give various examples of using OTTER to design circuits, 
including the following rather well known two-inverter circuit-design problem. 
Using as many AND and OR gates as you like, but using only two NOT gates, can 
you  design a circuit according to the following specification? There  are three inputs, 
il, i2, and  i3, and three outputs, oi, o2, and o3. The  outputs are related to the inputs 
in the following simple way: ol -- not(il) ; o2 = not(i2) ; o3 -- not(i3). 
Often, the shorter the proof, the fewer the components in the constructed object. Everything 
being equal, the fewer the gates a circuit requires, the more attractive is the circuit. A similar 
remark holds for algorithm synthesis. We note that we have experimented very little with that 
application. If we now take into account he use of the resonance strategy in successfully seeking 
shorter proofs, we see how this strategy is relevant O the two applications under discussion. 
Regarding the second aspect of elegance, term structure, the cited two-inverter problem pro- 
vides an excellent example. The problem requires using no more than two NOT gates. When 
OTTER is asked to construct he desired circuit, the corresponding proof that is sought is con- 
strained in that no step is allowed to contain more than two occurrences of the function not. As 
for algorithm synthesis, one can easily imagine the case in which one wishes to avoid nested divide 
instructions. As discussed earlier in this section, the resonance strategy can be put to good use 
in this context when coupled with demodulators of the type given in Section 7.2. 
As for the third aspect of elegance cited in this article, that of compactness, its presence in a 
proof can signal a breakthrough in efficiency either for circuit design or for algorithm synthesis. 
Indeed, imagine that the goal is the design of three circuits and that the assignment is given to 
OTTER by placing in list(passive) what amounts to the assumption that such is not possible for 
any of the three. The situation is like that in which the object is to prove each of theses 18, 35, 
and 49 (the Church axiom system) by using the Lukasiewicz axiom system consisting of L1, L2, 
and L3. In place of the Lukasiewicz axioms, let us assume that the input includes axioms that 
give the properties of the components to be used, for example, the properties of various gates. 
If OTTER is successful in finding the desired three proofs, if the use of the ANSWER literal 
results in the presentation of each of the sought-after circuits, and if one of the proofs is compact, 
then the other two proofs are subproofs of the compact proof. Should such occur, one has been 
presented with three circuits of interest, two of which are subcircuits of the third. One might then 
be able to take advantage of the given design to save on componellts and, with suitable actions, 
to add to the efficiency of the global design. Although we have had virtually no experience with 
algorithm synthesis, similar observations hold for algorithm synthesis in the context of finding 
a compact proof. Such a proof can provide one with code for one subroutine that has within it 
the needed appropriate code for smaller subroutines, reminiscent of what compilers attempt o 
produce to increase program efficiency. Because the resonance strategy can be used to squeeze 
steps out of a proof (by using it to seek shorter proofs), this strategy may prove useful when the 
goal is that of increasing efficiency either for circuit design or for algorithm synthesis. 
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we define the resonance strategy and present evidence of its value, particularly 
in the context of seeking more elegant proofs. The resonance strategy asks the researcher to 
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choose resonators, formulas and equations whose functional shape (ignoring the particular vari- 
able occurrences within them) suggests they will be useful in directing an automating reasoning 
program's earch for assignment completion. To each resonator, one assigns an integer, called 
its value or weight, that prioritizes similar expressions: the smaller the integer, the higher the 
priority for being chosen to direct the reasoning. An expression is similar to a given resonator if
and only if the two are identical when the variables are ignored, in other words, the two have the 
same shape or functional skeleton. 
In one sense, resonators generalize lemmas. For example, where in Boolean groups--those 
in which the square of every x is the identity element e--the lemmas yzyz  -- e and yyzz  = e 
are such that neither generalizes the other, the resonator xyzx  -- e, by treating variables as 
indistinguishable, generalizes and captures (in a manner that is discussed in this article) both 
lemmas. Where resonators (which do not  take on the value true or false) are used to guide a 
reasoning program's earch, lemmas are basic truths from which to reason. 
One of the more successful uses of the resonance strategy is that of finding shorter proofs; in 
this article, we give examples from group theory, Robbins algebra, and various logic calculi. From 
the perspective of science as a whole, the successful search for shorter proofs can result in the 
discovery of useful lemmas that are fundamental to the field under study. The use of lemmas (or 
basic truths) not only often is the means for reducing the length of a proof and adding elegance 
but frequently leads to significant advances uch as the design of a more efficient circuit or a 
more effective algorithm. Therefore, one benefit of using the resonance strategy is that of finding 
useful and sometimes powerful emmas. 
McCune's automated reasoning program OTTER offers a mechanism, weighting, that pro- 
vides the researcher a convenient way to rely on the resonance strategy. However, since the 
resonance strategy is used to direct a program's search by giving preference to formulas or equa- 
tions that match at the skeletal evel (ignoring variables) some resonator, the strategy can be 
implemented with a string-comparing algorithm rather than with weighting. With OTTER, one 
simply places the chosen resonators with the chosen value in the appropriate weight_list, usually 
in weight_list(pick_and_purge). A judicious choice of resonators can transform a question to be 
answered from the unreachable to the easy-to-answer. Intuitively, the explanation rests with the 
fact that the resonance strategy provides a means for escaping from cul-de-sacs, navigating po- 
tentially wide valleys, and crossing high plateaus. By a wide valley, we refer to the case in which 
one needs the use of a conclusion with, say, 18 symbols in it and one is mired in a huge space 
of conclusions each consisting of 14 symbols. By a high plateau, we refer to the case in which 
the proof requires the use of three or more consecutive conclusions each of whose complexity is 
at least moderately greater than the vast majority of conclusions being retained. Clearly, the 
resonance strategy is but one piece for solving the puzzle of proof finding, whether or not the 
assignment includes the search for short  proofs. 
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